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Unitary Taxation in the Extractive Industry Sector 
 
Erika Siu, Sol Picciotto, Jack Mintz and Akilagpa Sawyerr 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper analyses whether a global unitary taxation approach to corporate income tax 
(CIT) can improve the ability of governments to design and administer efficient and effective 
tax and royalty policies for the extractive industries. Drawing upon experience with unitary 
approaches to corporate income taxation of the extractive sectors in subnational taxation 
systems of the United States (US) and Canada, this paper suggests that a unitary CIT should 
not be used in isolation, or be employed as the dominant source of revenue from the 
extractive sector. Instead, because of its informational and risk-aligning advantages, a 
unitary CIT may be best used in combination with other rent/profit-related levies on the 
extractive sector. At the same time the rent/profit-related levies may be assessed on a more 
limited base, such as source jurisdiction, in order to alleviate source entitlement concerns. 
Within this context a unitary CIT is recommended, because it enables more effective design 
and administration of all taxes in the extractive industries sector. 
   
Keywords: unitary taxation; formulary apportionment; combined reporting; extractive 
industries; natural resource taxation; royalties; US state corporate income tax system; 
Canada provincial corporate income tax system. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the global unitary taxation (UT) approach as applied 
to taxation of the extractive industry (EI) sector.1 Governments of resource-rich countries that 
own extractive resource deposits rely on resource revenue from the extractive industry to 
fund their public services. Transnational corporations (TNCs) or private producers that agree 
with governments to extract non-renewable resources seek profits from the development of 
resources. The relationship between private producers and governments is therefore akin to 
that of principal and agent, with the government as principal and the private producer as the 
agent.2   
 
The aims of a government’s fiscal design are threefold.  
  
 As owner of the resource, the government is entitled to the economic rent, defined as the 
difference between revenue and the full economic cost of exploring, developing and 
extracting the resource. 
 To attract the most efficient private producer to extract the resource, a rate of return, net 
of fiscal levies, should be offered that is comparable to opportunities elsewhere. 
 The levy should be as efficient as possible with minimal distortions, to maximise the rent 
available to both the government and the producer.3  
 
Governments raise resource revenue through a variety of EI levies, including 
company/corporate income tax (CIT), severance (or resource) taxes, royalties, bonus bids 
(payments on contract signing) and production bonuses (payments at certain levels of 
production), as well as rental payments, property, sales and capital gains tax, each of which 
affects incentives for private producers to invest in the jurisdiction.4 The economic aims of 
CIT include backstopping personal income tax and ensuring that companies, which benefit 
from public services, contribute to their costs (Mintz 1996). Royalties, severance taxes and 
production bonuses, which are ex post payments and may be volume-based, revenue-based 
(ad valorem) or rent/profit-related,5 are payments made by companies to governments for the 
right to extract resources. Bonus bids or rental payments are ex ante payments for the 
property right to explore for a resource. 
 
Considerable research and policy debate is now attempting to improve the design of 
taxation, particularly of mining and extraction of hydrocarbons.6 Unitary taxation as a basis 
for CIT is currently used to apportion company income across tax jurisdictions at the 
subnational level in several countries, such as Canada, Switzerland and the US, rather than 
                                                 
1  This paper is a discussion of the use of a global unitary taxation approach to CIT and its effects on taxation of the entire 
extractives sector, including the mining and oil and gas subsectors. While acknowledging the major differences between 
these subsectors, the focus of this analysis is how a unitary approach to CIT affects the design and implementation of 
other resource taxes on extractives. Thus, case studies from Canada and the US will include both mining and oil and 
gas subsectors. An area of further research could include more specific treatment of these subsectors.  
2  See Mintz and Chen (2012). 
3  Here we use the term efficiency to denote allocative or economic efficiency.  A tax system achieves economic efficiency 
if resources are put to their best use to maximise economic welfare or a standard of living.  A company tax is efficient if 
capital is allocated to its most productive use. 
4  A severance (or resource) tax is imposed by the state on the producer for the removal of a non-renewable resource, 
such as oil, gas or hard minerals. Most US states impose severance taxes in addition to royalties, while Canadian 
provinces impose royalties on the extraction of natural resources. 
5  We use the term ‘rent/profit-related’ to refer to levies that take account of costs and revenue, while acknowledging that 
the rent levy is not the same as the tax on profits under a CIT or profit-based levy. Rent-based levies provide an explicit 
or implicit deduction for the full cost of financing including the imputed cost of equity financing and full loss offsetting, 
while profit-based levies only account for income and costs for the purposes of calculating company profits, which does 
not include all economic costs, such as the implicit cost of equity financing. See Section 1.2 and Mintz and Chen (2012) 
for further explanation. 
6  See especially Daniel et al. (2010) and IMF (2012). The policy prescription currently favoured for developing countries is 
a combination of CIT, Rent Resource Tax (RRT) and ad valorem royalty (IMF 2012: 26 para. 48). 
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to rely on separate accounting and the arm’s length principle (SE-ALP) to determine the tax 
base in the province or state.7 Discussions continue to develop a common consolidated 
corporate tax base (CCCTB) at the regional level among European Union (EU) members, 
following a UT approach. In recent years, there has also been renewed interest in unitary 
taxation and formulary apportionment as an alternative to SE-ALP.8 Yet to date, despite the 
existence of various models at the subnational level, there has not been analysis of how a 
UT approach would apply, particularly, to taxation of the EI sector. The purpose of this paper 
is to discuss whether a global UT approach to CIT can improve the ability of governments to 
formulate and administer optimally designed tax and royalty policies for the EI sector. We 
suggest that there are three reasons it could do so. 
 
First, UT could assist governments not only to improve general CIT design but also to 
develop better rent/profit-related EI levies. Both CIT and rent/profit-related EI levies pose 
similar problems in relation to the determination of appropriate transfer prices for inputs, 
allocating overhead costs (general administration and other joint costs) and financing 
expenditure, with opportunities for what is now described as base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS). In addition, the use of UT based on a common global corporate group tax base for 
TNCs in the EI sector could reduce administration and compliance costs associated with 
both CIT and rent/profit-related levies.  
 
Second, the development of new transparency rules under the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), implemented in over forty countries as of this writing, as well 
as new legislation in the EU and US, and wider G20 initiatives to improve transparency, will 
result in the reporting of payments to governments by EIs. Public information on tax 
payments will allow states to evaluate whether they are receiving appropriate revenue from 
EIs. To the extent that governments, under pressure from public opinion, feel that insufficient 
revenue is being raised, they may gravitate to less efficient forms of taxation that discourage 
investment in their jurisdiction. A UT approach, which requires country-by-country reporting 
on revenue, costs and tax payments, and the apportionment of global revenue based on that 
information, could assist in the development of better EI levy policies that are sensitive to the 
risks and costs incurred by private companies in extracting resources. 
 
Third, a UT approach to CIT in the EI sector would better align the risks and rewards of 
natural resource extraction among governments and private producers. A unitary approach 
would allow global offsetting of company profits, as well as provide information for better-
designed EI levies and reduce fiscal distortions affecting EI investment. TNCs invest until the 
return is sufficient to cover the cost of capital including depreciation, inventory cost and risk. 
A unitary approach to CIT in the EI sector would, thus, maximise the overall rent shared by 
the government and private producers. 
 
Our full discussion of these issues follows below. The first section provides background on 
issues related to EI fiscal levies. The next sections look at how the UT approach to CIT, as 
developed in Canada and the US, is applied to the EI. Following that, we will consider 
whether and how a global UT approach to CIT could improve the design and implementation 
of rent/profit-related levies imposed on the EI. 
 
 
                                                 
7  Some scholars use the term ‘unitary’ to refer exclusively to systems that define a corporate group according to the 
unitary business principle and then combine the tax base, and reserve the term ‘formulary apportionment’ to refer 
exclusively to systems that apportion the tax base regardless of the method of aggregation. See, e.g., Hellerstein (2005: 
105): ‘Formulary apportionment is compatible with - but by no means required by - consolidated reporting, at least as a 
matter of principle’. In this paper we treat the entire spectrum of cross-border aggregation of the tax base as unitary 
approaches, while specifying the methods used by each system in the discussion. 
8  See, e.g., Weiner (2005); Roin (2008); Avi Yonah et al. (2009). 
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1  Background on fiscal regimes in the 
extractive sector  
 
The exploitation of natural resources, especially extraction of oil, gas and hard minerals, is 
key to the economic development of many developing countries. Indeed, it has been central 
to their integration into the global capitalist economy. Large foreign-owned firms, often 
vertically-integrated, dominate natural resource extraction. However, there continue to be 
local small-scale miners in some countries, especially in hard minerals, although they often 
find it hard to survive competing in a sector that is capital-intensive and has important 
economies of scale, and may be either bought out or expropriated. Where they do continue, 
they may range from truly artisanal (usually alluvial) mining, to operations using increasingly 
sophisticated machinery, generally with small-scale foreign financing and technical 
leadership. Some apparently make more than a decent living, while remaining sometimes 
illegal and generally outside the tax net.9 
 
Attracting foreign investment is generally considered necessary for large-scale exploitation, 
and beneficial for economic growth. However, apart from a few countries with a large local 
market and a sufficiently skilled workforce to provide services to the industry, minerals and 
hydrocarbons are usually exported with little or no local processing, so the economic spread 
effects are lessened. The capital-intensive nature of the sector also means that it does not 
create extensive employment in its operations. Although some policy measures to reverse 
both of these trends have been debated (Economic Commission for Africa 2011; Africa 
Progress Panel 2013), they are likely to remain characteristic of EIs in many developing 
countries, especially smaller ones.  
 
Hence, revenue from EI levies is a significant benefit for host countries. Expectations have 
been high, especially in periods of relatively high world prices which help drive new 
investment and improved exploration technology. Yet the experience in many developing 
countries has been that government revenue from EI levies has been disappointingly low 
during boom years. Attention has focused especially on profit-based levies, and some have 
criticised the shift towards such taxes and away from volume-based levies (Lundstøl et al. 
2013; Curtis et al. 2012).10 Yet governments often introduce new tax incentives to encourage 
investment when profits are low or negative during downturns. Such instability in resource 
tax policy will discourage investment in the long run. A resource tax that recognises both 
revenue and costs is most efficient and fair to employ. However, profit measures can be 
difficult to assess unless prices and costs are determined independently, reflecting an 
appropriate market price for transactions. 
 
Establishing an effective framework for fair and efficient taxation of the profits of large 
foreign-owned TNCs, which generally dominate the EI sector, has been especially 
challenging for smaller developing countries. A particular issue of concern is the widely-
accepted separate entity principle applied in the assessment of profit-based levies – that is, 
for the purposes of calculating taxable income or profits, the affiliates of a TNC in different 
countries should be treated as if they were separate entities dealing at arm’s length.11 This 
paper results from a project that is part of a wider programme aiming to investigate the 
desirability and feasibility of a transition towards a unitary entity principle, which would treat 
an integrated TNC as a unitary firm and apportion taxable profits according to appropriate 
                                                 
9  e.g. the widespread practice described as ‘galamsey’ in Ghana. 
10  There have also been inquiries and reports by governments, e.g. in Tanzania the Bomani Report (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2008). For an active public debate, notably involving the opposition shadow finance minister Zitto Kabwe, see 
<http://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/?s=mining>. For the legal framework of mining taxation in Tanzania, see Muganyizi 
(2012). 
11  See Picciotto (2013). 
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criteria. The aim of this project is to investigate the implications of adopting a global UT 
approach for the EI sector. First, however, we will briefly discuss the related issue of 
transparency, which has been especially salient in the EI sector. 
 
1.1 Complex governance and opacity 
 
In many countries minerals are considered national assets, and are state-owned. To ensure 
their exploitation in the national interest, many countries nationalised concessions in the 
1960s and 1970s with the establishment of state-owned firms (e.g. in hydrocarbons). 
However, even in countries where state-owned enterprises have become relatively powerful, 
they are still often dependent on foreign firms for capital investment, technology, 
management and market access. This results in various types of public-private joint ventures 
and production-sharing arrangements.  
 
EIs entail large up-front investment resulting in sunk costs for exploration, development and 
setting up mining or drilling sites. The level of such investment has been rising fast, as 
exploitation has shifted to less easily-extracted deposits. Concessions are therefore often 
major projects, generally governed by detailed contracts between firms and investors with 
the government (OpenOil 2012, 2013). Overlaid on these contractual governance structures 
are national laws and regulations, as well as international treaties, forming a complex 
regulatory web. The resulting legal interactions can be surprising and contradictory, 
sometimes resulting in the creation of a specific regime for a firm and even for particular EI 
projects. In addition, tax treaties normally create preferential tax rules for foreign investors, 
such as reduced withholding taxes on dividend and interest payments. Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) also give foreign investors rights which can override national law, especially 
the prohibition of ‘takings’, and the obligation to give ‘fair and equitable treatment’, which may 
be interpreted to restrict actions such as the denial of tax exemptions or imposition of new or 
exceptional taxes.12  
 
Special rights or privileges may also be given to investors under national mining/petroleum or 
foreign investment promotion laws, such as exemption from import duties for equipment, 
special depreciation rules, or ‘standstill/stability clauses’ that restrict the effects of 
subsequent changes in legislation. As a result, the contract or concession governing a 
particular project may insulate the investor from national law or regulation. However, as the 
recent Tullow ruling in Uganda illustrates, tax authorities have launched successful 
challenges against the application of preferential contract provisions that attempt to 
supersede tax laws enacted through a democratic process.13 Such provisions often result in 
low government revenue from income and capital gains taxes on EI firms. Negotiation of 
these contracts is often the responsibility of mining ministries that regard their main role as 
attracting investment, disregarding the concern of tax authorities to ensure appropriate 
revenue to the state. Public concern about low EI revenue, especially in periods of high world 
prices, has led to renegotiation of contracts in a number of African countries, often focusing 
on revision of the taxation framework (Charlet et al. 2013).14 In countries with extensive 
                                                 
12  e.g. hydrocarbon firm Occidental in 2004 was awarded US$71 million against the government of Ecuador under the US-
Ecuador BIT, for denial of Value Added Tax refunds; the arbitral award was upheld by the UK High Court (Republic of 
Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Co [2006] EWHC 345 (Comm)). However, in 2006 Canadian energy 
firm Encana lost a similar dispute, partly because its investment in Ecuador had been through its Barbados affiliate 
(EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, London Court of International Arbitration, 3 February 2006).  
13  See Tullow Oil v. Uganda Revenue Authority, Uganda Tax Appeals Tribunal, Tax App. No. 4 of 2011 (16 June 2014). 
The Tullow case involved a dispute on the assessment of over US$400 million in capital gains taxes, which the private 
producer claimed were exempted through a provision in the production sharing agreement (PSA) contract.  The Tribunal 
agreed that the exemption applied to the transfer that produced the tax assessment, but held that the exemption in the 
PSA signed by a government minister could not supersede tax laws passed by parliament. ‘The framers of the 1995 
Constitution of Uganda thought it wise that the people’s representatives should be the most suitable persons to impose 
the taxes they should pay. So be it.’ (Uganda Tax Appeals Tribunal, Tax App. No. 4 of 2011: 52). 
14  In Tanzania existing mining development agreements restricted the applicability of the reforms introduced in 2010; see 
Muganyizi (2012). 
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natural resources the stark contrast between the large revenue flows generated, and the lack 
of any evident resulting benefits for the vast majority of the population, has generated debate 
about the ‘resource curse’.15 The ad hoc nature of concession contracts and other structural 
features of EI investment make this sector particularly prone to corruption.  
 
An important response has been the development of transparency obligations, in the form of 
country-by-country reporting (CbCR). The EITI has established a global standard for 
disclosure of company payments and government receipts, governed by a multi-stakeholder 
model.16 This has now inspired formal legal requirements in the US and EU. The Dodd-Frank 
Act17 introduced an obligation for any company subject to Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filing requirements to report on a country-by-country basis any payments 
made to government or public agencies in connection with development of oil, gas or mineral 
reserves, by project and business segment. Although the detailed regulations under Dodd-
Frank have been the target of frequent legal challenge, as of this writing a little over half the 
required rules have been finalised.18 Meanwhile, the EU Accounting and Transparency 
Directive was approved in July 2013;19 this will require reporting (for financial years after 
2016) by companies formed in the EU involved in oil, gas, minerals or logging of natural 
forests, of payments made to each government and per project. 
 
These specific provisions for CbCR in the EI sector will apply in parallel with the more 
general arrangements being developed as part of the OECD BEPS project, resulting from the 
G8 Lough Erne Declaration and the G20’s St. Petersburg Declaration Tax Annex (OECD 
2014). A significant difference is that the specific EI regulations aim at public disclosure, 
whereas the OECD envisions disclosure only to tax authorities. However, the information to 
be included in the CbCR tax-reporting template is likely to be more extensive. 
 
The introduction of CbCR will have a major impact on TNC taxation. In the EI sector, where it 
has been spreading for some time due to the EITI, this impact is already becoming evident. 
The increased transparency resulting from EITI reporting has greatly contributed to the 
heightened public awareness and debate, fed by reports that have used the published data.20 
The standardised template for CbCR being developed by OECD could also be an important 
tool for tax authorities. At the same time, the development of this template should take into 
account both the characteristics of specific important industry sectors such as EI, and the 
ways in which tax authorities might wish to use it in applying UT approaches to such sectors. 
This project aims to begin to map out and examine such approaches. In the remainder of this 
section we will briefly analyse EI taxation and the implications for it of international tax rules, 
especially SE-ALP. 
 
1.2 EI taxes and their treatment under international tax rules 
 
Fiscal regimes for the extractives sector are distinctive in that, in addition to the usual CIT on 
business profits, states generally seek to tax the rent from natural resource extraction 
through levies, such as royalties and severance (or resource) taxes. Economic rent 
(sometimes called ‘above normal profit’) is defined as the excess of revenue over the costs 
of discovery, development and production, less a normal return to capital.  
                                                 
15  Countries with better governance overcome the resource curse, with their resource sectors associated with above 
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (e.g. Canada, Netherlands, Norway and the US). Other countries 
experience a resource curse with a resource sector associated with lower GDP growth rates, in some cases negative 
growth rates. See Gelb (2014). 
16  The EITI Principles were agreed at a conference in London in 2003, and the EITI Standard, extending to 
implementation, governance and management, was adopted in 2013; see <http://eiti.org/>. 
17  Wall St Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, s.1504. 
18  Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Progress Report available at <http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-
Report/> (last accessed 9 July 2014). 
19  Directive 2013/34/EU, to be implemented by member states within two years. 
20  Such as Mintz and Chen (2012). 
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Depending on the choice of base, each type of EI levy captures varying amounts of 
economic rent. Rent-based levies are specifically designed to capture economic rent, 
distinguishing it from other volume-, revenue- or profit-based levies. First, a rent-based levy 
differs from a profit-based levy because it provides an explicit or implicit deduction for the full 
cost of financing including the imputed cost of equity financing and full loss offsetting. A 
profit-based levy, however, typically only accounts for income and costs for the purposes of 
calculating company profits, which does not include the cost of equity financing. Revenue-
based or ad valorem levies take account of market prices, but they do not explicitly 
incorporate costs into the base. Finally, volume-based levies are assessed on production 
output and do not explicitly incorporate costs or market prices. In early stages of exploration 
and production a rent-based levy will generate negative returns, which may be carried 
forward as losses under a Resource Rent Tax (RRT) or be refundable under an R-based 
cash flow tax.21 However, once all economic costs are covered, rent-based taxes can be 
expected to produce significantly higher revenue than volume-, revenue- or profit-based 
levies.22  
 
Although revenue- and (especially) volume-based levies are considered to be less precise 
instruments in capturing economic rent, there may be an inherent tension between the risk 
preference of the government and the private producer. This preference for risk will affect the 
timing of payout. Generally, governments with a low risk preference prefer earlier and 
continuous payout, and the private producer prefers payout at a later time after all economic 
costs have been covered. Hence, even though rent-based levies are more effective at 
capturing above normal profits from natural resource extraction, governments with lower risk 
tolerance may prefer early payments such as bonus bids as well as continuous payments 
such as rental payments and volume- or revenue-based levies. Another advantage of these 
types of early and continuous levies is that they are relatively easy to administer, since they 
do not require accounting of costs (or prices in the case of volume-based levies, bonus bids 
and rental payments).  
 
However, volume-based levies (and revenue-based levies to some extent) used in isolation 
may have negative consequences for governments. First, because both levies disregard 
costs they may discourage investment, usually in the form of large up-front outlays for 
exploration, drilling, and construction of extraction and production facilities. Secondly, use of 
volume-based levies alone may result in less than optimal levels of rent at times of high 
prices. Given that revenue in the EI sector is notoriously volatile due to fluctuating commodity 
prices, capturing revenue on the upswing would be a distinct advantage for a government. 
Hence, such levies should be used in combination with other instruments that more precisely 
capture rent, and also such levies should be set at a relatively low rate so as not to 
discourage investment from private producers. By choosing a suitable mix of EI levies, a 
country may be able to optimise the advantages of each type.23 These levies are outlined in 
Table 1.  
 
                                                 
21  See Daniel et al. (2010: 32-33). 
22  Government revenue may also be derived by other means, e.g. production sharing agreements, especially in petroleum; 
these are not considered here. However, similar issues may arise in that context - notably transfer pricing.  
23  Under rent-based tax, it is not unusual for governments to use a minimum tax based on revenue or volume to ensure 
payment early on when production begins to ramp up.  If the minimum tax is fully credible against the rent tax, such as 
enabling any unused minimum tax payments to be carried forward at a rate of interest, the government receives more 
money up front and less in the future compared to relying on a rent tax alone.  On a present value basis, the total rent 
collected by the government is the same in principle. 
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Table 1 EI levy classification and international tax implications 
Timing of 
payout 
Type of levy Base International tax 
treatment 
Related party 
transaction issues 
ex ante 
production 
Bonus bids, rental 
payments*  
Specific amount Not eligible for credit, 
treated as expense 
None 
ex post 
production 
Production bonus 
payments, volume-
based royalty or tax  
Generally unit of production Not eligible for credit, 
treated as expense 
None 
Revenue-based (ad 
valorem) royalty or 
tax 
Generally price/revenue based Unlikely to be eligible 
for credit, treated as 
expense 
Need to benchmark 
product price 
Profit-based royalty 
or tax 
Generally income minus costs 
(may include cost of capital) 
Case by case 
determination 
Must apply SE-ALP to 
related party transactions 
CIT Profit-based: income minus cost 
of capital including depreciation, 
inventory cost and risk 
Can be credited Must apply SE-ALP to 
related party transactions 
Rent-based royalty or 
tax 
Revenue and costs as in CIT 
plus costs of equity financing 
May be eligible for 
credit 
Must apply SE-ALP to 
related party transactions 
 
* Rental payments can be ex ante or ex post payments, depending on contractual terms. 
 
The choice of EI tax structure should also take account of the international tax implications. 
Formally, a country is only bound by international tax rules to the extent that it is party to 
treaties embodying them. Many developing countries have few such treaties (Lang and 
Owens 2014). Even without a treaty in place, however, a developing country may 
nevertheless be affected by international tax rules in two main ways. First, their governments 
may be advised of the desirability to abide by international tax norms, at least in general 
terms, to meet investor expectations. Secondly, recognition of the compatibility of a tax with 
international tax rules may have important implications: in particular, it may enable treatment 
of taxes paid as a credit against the tax liability of the parent company, rather than merely 
deductible as an expense. A tax that falls within those defined (and usually specifically listed) 
in a tax treaty is legally entitled to a credit, at least for countries which provide such credits. 
However, countries such as the US also grant a unilateral foreign tax credit in specified 
circumstances.24 Eligibility for credit is limited to taxes that correspond or are equivalent to 
the income or profit tax against which they are to be credited.25 Hence, they are unlikely to be 
available for taxes that are not profit-based, such as a volume- or revenue-based levy. In 
most circumstances, a credit is more beneficial to the company than expensing the payment 
(and, in any case, eligibility for credit usually allows the company to choose). Consequently, 
profit-based taxes are less likely to deter inward investment.  
 
Table 1 shows that only non-profit and non-revenue-based taxes are free from the problem 
of evaluating related party transactions. The more a tax is profit-related, the greater the 
complexity of evaluation. A revenue-based levy poses the problem of pricing the revenue 
derived from sales of the product at the wellhead or pitmouth, since observed prices are at a 
market to which the product must be transported. However, in the case of a vertically-
integrated firm, such sales will be to affiliates and the firm’s revenue will ultimately come from 
sales of refined or processed products to third parties. The intra-firm contract price must 
therefore be evaluated against a suitable benchmark.26 Although world market price 
benchmarks exist for some types of resource, such as crude oil and many minerals, they 
cannot be used directly without adjustments, especially for the quality of the specific product 
involved and its location. Even with adjustments, such prices may not reflect the real value to 
the company. Some parts of the EI sector are so dominated by large firms that market prices 
do not exist, or are clearly unsuitable. For minerals, such prices are often for refined product 
                                                 
24  In the UK under the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act (TIOPA) s.8, and in the US under Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) ss. 901-908.  
25  Crediting is possible in the US for some rent-based taxes that are not typical CITs.  See McLure et al (forthcoming). 
26  This poses fewer problems than for manufacturing firms, since raw material commodities are more widely traded. 
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and require complex ‘netback’ calculations to arrive at appropriate export prices (IMF 2012: 
30). 
 
Rent/profit-related levies directly pose the issue of compliance with international tax rules, 
especially SE-ALP, which requires the tax authority to assess the profits of the local affiliate 
by starting from its own accounts, and adjust intra-firm transaction prices using accepted 
transfer pricing methods. Related party transactions on the cost side may include intra-firm 
charges for joint costs such as management fees and technical services, and royalties for 
intellectual property rights. The latter have become increasingly significant, as technology 
has become more important for EIs. These rent/profit-related levies could provide a 
presumptive charge for joint costs (as well as intellectual property rights), and use standard 
available benchmarks for direct costs. Issues may still remain, such as pricing of equipment 
transferred from related parties that make such simplified methods unsuitable in evaluating 
costs from related party transactions. On the revenue side, as mentioned above, revenue 
may be evaluated using appropriate and easily available benchmarks, such as exchange 
traded prices (Charlet et al. 2013). However, these may not reflect the real value to the 
company, which is more important for profit-based levies. Even a slight variation may make a 
big difference for profitability. This variation is further magnified if the same benchmark is 
used for both revenue-based and profit-based levies, due to the high marginal rate resulting 
from accumulation.  
 
Finally, probably most significant for rent/profit-related levies in the EI sector is dealing with 
opportunities for tax avoidance through financial engineering, since the high level of 
investment involved means that financing terms are very significant. Also specific financial 
techniques are available for EIs, notably the use of derivatives that can be designed to 
attribute losses to affiliates in high-tax countries and profits to those in low-tax jurisdictions 
(Aarsnes 2011). 
 
 
2  Applying a unitary approach to the EI sector 
 
The analysis above indicates that, unlike in other sectors, it is to some extent possible in EIs 
to avoid the problems posed by international tax rules, especially the challenges created by 
SE-ALP. Avoiding these problems requires reliance to a great extent on non-profit-based 
levies. However, economic analysis suggests that such taxes are suboptimal for capturing 
the highest level of economic rent. Indeed it was for this reason that advice, especially from 
the World Bank, led many countries to move towards greater adoption of rent/profit-related 
levies. However, for CIT and revenue-based and rent/profit-related levies, the related-party 
transaction issues have created difficulties for governments in administration and capturing 
revenue. Hence, it is important to evaluate how far, and in what ways, the adoption of a UT 
approach to aggregation and apportionment of the CIT base could provide helpful solutions 
for effective taxation in the EI sector, which would enhance the administration and design of 
rent/profit-related levies.  
 
2.1 Defining the tax base 
 
UT approaches define the tax base by aggregating income from a corporate unit, and then 
apportioning the tax base among the relevant jurisdictions through a formula. A formula is 
used as an approximation of the source of the income based on the location of economic 
value-creating activities, such as investment in labour and capital assets, as well as gross 
revenue. 
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In applying a UT approach to any tax instrument on profits, the scope of tax base 
aggregation should be clarified. Thus, for any instrument assessed on a base that 
incorporates expenses (such as overheads, transportation or intra-firm services), or capital 
costs (such as depreciation, inventory cost or risk), the scope of aggregation will have a 
significant effect on determination of the taxable base.  
 
As Figure 1 below illustrates, the scope of aggregation may be envisioned along a spectrum. 
Ring-fenced or project-based tax bases lie at the far left (assuming the project is contained 
within only one state); aggregation of the cross-border tax base at the legal entity level is 
next; followed by aggregation within the corporate group after separate entity accounting;27 
and full aggregation of income, expenses and tax attributes within the corporate group at the 
far right. Under full aggregation the corporate group may be merged based on the unitary 
business principle, by an ownership test, or a hybrid of both. Additionally, apart from ring-
fenced tax bases, the tax base may also be aggregated on a worldwide or water’s edge 
basis.28  
 
Figure 1 CIT base aggregation for the EI sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now turn to an examination of select UT approaches as currently applied to EI sectors in 
the Canadian and US subnational formulary apportionment systems. Each tax scheme will 
be examined in regard to the individual levies, their corresponding bases, the scope of tax 
base aggregation and apportionment formulas. Finally, based on these case studies, we 
conclude with an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of such approaches for 
the EI sector, with a focus on their potential application to EI sectors in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
27  Consolidated reporting is allowed at the US federal level. See 15 USC § 1501 et seq. 
28  Water’s edge means that the scope of tax base aggregation is limited to the boundaries of the entire jurisdiction 
applying the unitary approach. Often the jurisdiction is a country, as in the states of the US or the provinces of Canada. 
However, the jurisdiction could be a larger economic community, such as member states of the EU, as proposed in the 
EU CCCTB. Conversely, a worldwide approach to tax base aggregation would combine the global taxable profits/losses 
of a taxpayer, as in the case of the EI sector in Alaska. 
Canadian 
provinces, 
Louisiana 
ring fencing of 
the tax base by 
state, project 
or wellhead   
Minnesota 
(no CIT) 
Loss transfer 
system at 
US fed level 
Alaska, 
North Dakota, 
Texas 
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2.2 Case studies of UT approaches in the Canadian and US subnational 
formulary apportionment systems 
 
There is considerable experience of a UT approach at subnational levels in Canada and the 
US, which are major natural resource producers. In the US there is greater variety due to the 
lack of a comprehensive tax harmonisation law among the states. For example, for CIT in the 
oil, gas and pipelines sector, Alaska requires aggregation of all the income and expenses of 
the entities that comprise a worldwide unitary business, and apportionment through a special 
formula that takes into account the amount of resource extracted. Moreover, a combined 
report of worldwide activities of the unitary business is required in a taxpayer’s annual filing. 
In contrast, Minnesota exempts producers in the taconite industry from CIT, and instead 
assesses a tax on all the in-state mining revenue (with limited deductions) of the taxpayer. At 
the provincial level in Canada, income earned from corporations with permanent 
establishments in more than one jurisdiction is subject to allocation through a two-factor 
formula comprised of gross revenue and payroll. However, there is no aggregation of the tax 
base beyond the legal entity level, and no reporting requirements of subsidiary income (in 
other words no consolidation of corporate groups). Although there is a diversity of royalty, 
CIT rates and tax credits throughout the resource-producing provinces, the CIT base and 
allocation formula for the extractives industry follow the general rules set for other industries. 
The following sections describe these systems in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 UT approaches in the EI sector in Canada 
 
The Canadian constitution (originally the British North America Act of 1867 and renamed the 
Constitution Act of 1982) lays out the taxing powers of federal and provincial governments. 
The federal government has the power to tax according to any ‘mode or system of 
taxation’.29 The provinces were given the power to levy direct taxes ‘within the province for 
provincial purposes’,30 which were interpreted as taxes paid by the person subject to tax 
(such as income taxes). The ownership of resources was also given to the provinces,31 
enabling provinces to levy royalties (royalties are broadly defined as payments made to 
governments for the right to extract resources from government-owned lands). By implication 
the federal government may levy CIT and other direct taxes on resource firms, but not 
royalties on provincial-owned resources. Provinces have not been given jurisdiction to levy 
indirect taxes and custom duties, as these are viewed as interfering with trade of goods and 
services across provincial boundaries. However, in 1982 the provinces were given the power 
to levy indirect taxes on resources produced from private lands. Only the federal government 
can assess withholding taxes on income paid to non-residents. 
 
The federal government and provinces in Canada therefore share the major tax fields: 
income, sales and payroll taxation. Given the overlapping federal and provincial powers as 
well as a tax jungle created by non-harmonised provincial taxes,32 the federal and provincial 
governments concluded ‘tax rental’ agreements in 1942 whereby the provinces agreed to 
vacate income and estate tax fields for rental payments, as well as debt and unemployment 
relief. After the Second World War, Quebec and Ontario adopted their own corporate taxes in 
1947 at a 7 per cent rate, with other provinces agreeing to a rental payment equal to 5 per 
                                                 
29  British North America Act (Constitution Act) 1867, Section 91(3).   
30  British North America Act (Constitution Act) 1867, Section 92(2) 
31  Section 109 states: ‘All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canada, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or 
Royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the 
same are situate or arise, subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the 
Province in the same’. Parallel sections were introduced when other provinces joined the Confederation, except for 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, which waited until 1930 when resource ownership was finally transferred to them.    
32  Rowell-Sirois Commission prior to the Second World War recommended the federal government take over personal 
income taxation, corporate income taxation and estate taxation for equalisation payments, debt relief and 
unemployment relief (see Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations 1940). 
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cent of provincial corporate taxable income (and Quebec adopted a personal income tax in 
1954). The allocation of corporate taxable income, which is quite relevant to the treatment of 
provincial corporate income, was developed at this time and is further detailed below. 
 
In 1962 Tax Collection Agreements replaced the tax rental agreements for corporate income, 
personal income and estate taxes. For CIT, the agreeing provinces would assess tax on 
income as defined by federal tax law, and the federal government reduced its CIT rate by an 
abatement to make room for provincial rates. The provinces could therefore choose the tax 
rate, surtax rates and investment tax credits. As part of the agreement, the federal 
government agreed to cover the cost of administering the tax without charge. 
 
Quebec and Ontario continued to operate their own provincial CITs in 1962. Alberta adopted 
its own CIT in 1980, in order to have better information and policy control over its corporate 
tax. Nevertheless, most base provisions under independent provincial corporate taxes were 
similar to the federal corporate tax, thereby providing significant benefits in terms of lower 
compliance and administrative costs (Technical Committee on Business Taxation 1997 
Chapter 11). Ontario agreed to harmonise its CIT with federal tax from 1 January 2009 in 
order to reduce costs.33  
 
The provinces collect their own capital taxes (most have now been phased out), payroll taxes 
and property taxes. Federal-provincial sales taxes have been harmonised with the federal 
Goods and Services Tax (a form of value-added taxation) in all provinces except for British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Alberta has no sales tax). Sales tax harmonisation 
has also reduced administrative and compliance costs in sales tax collection in Canada, and 
led to the removal of sales taxes on business inputs that is typical under retail sales taxes 
that continue in the aforementioned Western Provinces.  
 
One further point of importance is the role of equalisation in Canada, and its impact on tax 
policy harmonisation. Equalisation payments to provinces have been made to ensure that 
provinces have comparable fiscal capacity to offer comparable public services.34 The federal 
government makes payments to those provinces that have less fiscal capacity than the 
national average for five aggregated tax bases (personal income taxes, business income 
taxes, sales taxes, property taxes and resource revenue). Only one-half of resource revenue 
is subject to equalisation (although a province can exclude resource revenue if it improves 
their equalisation payment). ‘Have-not’ provinces with per capita tax bases below the 
national average receive equalisation payments equal to the difference between the national 
and provincial per capita tax base multiplied by the population of the province and national 
tax rate. A cap on total equalisation payments was introduced in 2007 to limit growth based 
on a three-year rolling average of GDP growth rates. Equalisation payments to provinces are 
limited to fiscal capacity including resource revenue that is no more than the poorest non-
recipient of equalisation payments. This cap has resulted in new interactions among 
provinces, whereby policies adopted in one province that increase equalisation payments 
come at the expense of equalisation paid to other provinces. 
 
The effect of equalisation has been to help harmonise tax policy in Canada by reducing the 
incentive to engage in tax competition, since tax reductions result in losses of equalisation 
revenue. If a province were to reduce its CIT rate the per capita tax base would grow relative 
to the national average, thereby reducing equalisation payments. On the other hand, 
recipient provinces have a financial incentive to increase tax rates, since the per capita base 
would decline relative to the national base and thereby increase equalisation payments. 
These financial incentives have been particularly important with respect to resource 
                                                 
33  It is estimated that harmonisation reduces compliance costs in Ontario by C$136.7 million per year <http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/whtsnw/tms/ctao-airso-eng.html>. 
34  For a description, see <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2008-20-e.htm>. 
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development and have resulted in past policy initiatives to reduce the clawback of 
equalisation on revenue for resource developments. For example, if an Atlantic Province 
were to develop a new offshore oil and gas project, the province would lose one dollar of 
equalisation payments for each dollar of resource revenue. The 2005 Atlantic Accords 
included a provision of compensatory payment to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and 
Labrador to offset the 100 per cent clawback. The policy was reversed, since it created 
inequities among provinces (Holden 2006). Resource revenue remains a constant source of 
debate in Canada, given its importance to differences among provinces in their overall fiscal 
capacity. 
 
2.2.2 Extractive industries and provincial taxation 
 
Extractive industries are subject to CIT as well as provincial royalties. The CIT in each 
province follows the federal base in determining revenue and costs. Specific to the industry, 
revenue is from the sale of product to the market as determined for a permanent 
establishment in the provinces. At the extraction stage, exploration is expensed and 
development costs are written off on a declining basis of 30 per cent. Post-production capital 
expenditure is depreciated according to the classification of asset (Canada primarily uses a 
pooled asset approach and declining balance depreciation for determining capital costs). A 
deduction is provided for resource royalties. 
 
The federal and provincial governments have undertaken several reforms in the past few 
years to reduce CIT incentives for mining and oil and gas. The federal government has cut 
back incentives for oil sand development by phasing out accelerated cost recovery for new 
mine assets by 2015. Oil sand development expenditure that was classified as exploration 
and fully expensed will not be written off at a 30 per cent rate as in the case of development. 
The federal government is also phasing out the mineral corporate exploration tax credit for 
mining by 2015, and the 10 per cent Atlantic Investment Tax Credit for oil, gas and mining by 
2015 (the credit will remain for agriculture, forestry and manufacturing in the Atlantic). The 
new mine accelerated cost provision (up to 100 per cent of a project’s income or at minimum 
of 25 per cent) is now being phased out for mining as of 2020.  
 
In 2007 the federal government fully phased out the resource allowance, which was a 25 per 
cent deduction from ‘resource profits’ (these profits are defined gross of interest, exploration 
and development costs) in lieu of resource royalty deductions. This provision was introduced 
to discourage provinces from raising resource royalties that were partly borne by the federal 
treasury through lower corporate tax collection. The federal government has returned to 
royalty deductibility, although Ontario has maintained the resource allowance for mining, 
which provides an additional incentive for exploration and development.  
 
With respect to the provincial royalties, most are profit-based in Canada except for 
conventional oil and gas, which historically began as a well-by-well royalty on sales. Under 
the revenue-based royalty system in Alberta, royalty rates vary by the volume and price for 
each well, which is a rough manner to account for costs that are not deductible from the 
base. With the development of non-conventional oil and gas projects, provincial governments 
have resorted to profit-based or rent-based regimes in recent years, applied on large projects 
or at the firm level.  
 
On the other hand, mining royalties in Canada have been historically based on profits. In 
earlier years provinces applied royalties on gross profit (no deduction was provided for 
borrowing costs), and capital costs were depreciated. To encourage processing, the 
provinces provided a generous deduction for processing capital costs. In the 1980s British 
Columbia introduced a cash flow mining tax, whereby capital expenditure is expensed 
against mining income or carried forward, indexed at a government bond rate to preserve the 
value of the deduction written off future income. The Alberta government, with respect to oil 
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sand developments, also adopted this cash flow approach to the British Columbia mining tax. 
The variation in CIT and royalty provisions related to mining and oil and gas is provided in 
Tables 2 and 3 below.  
 
Table 2 Corporate income and royalty provisions for major oil- and gas-producing 
provinces in Canada as of 2013 
Tax 
jurisdiction 
Deductibility of 
other levies 
Tax rate Tax base Special provisions 
CANADA 
- Federal 
Federal CIT rate is 
15%, under which all 
provincial royalty 
payments are 
deductible.  
Special tax provisions 
include: a 100% 
allowance for 
exploration cost, a 
30% annual allowance 
for development and a 
25% allowance for a 
special class of 
depreciable assets 
(Class 41), covering a 
broad range of assets 
used by the resource 
sector. 
Federal government collects 
royalty only from oil and gas 
produced on the ‘frontier 
lands,’ including ‘territorial 
sea’ and ‘continental shelf,’ 
which regions are outside 
the scope of this study.  
 
None 
Alberta Royalties are 
deductible for the 
purpose of CIT.  
 
 
CIT rate is 10% and 
the tax base matches 
that of the federal 
government. 
 
For conventional oil and gas, 
the royalty rate is based on 
gross revenue or production 
and is sensitive to both the 
market price and well 
productivity. For oil, the 
royalty ranges from 0% to 
40%, and for natural gas 5% 
to 36%. There is also an 
initial 5% royalty that applies 
in the first 12 months with a 
volume cap.  
For oil sands, a progressive 
gross royalty ranging from 
1% to 9% applies before 
payout. 
For oil sands only, in 
addition to a pre-payout 
gross royalty, there is a 
net royalty of 25% to 40% 
after payout depending on 
the price level of the oil.  
 
British 
Columbia 
Royalties are 
deductible for the 
purpose of CIT.  
 
 
CIT rate is 10% and 
the tax base matches 
that of the federal 
government. 
 
For conventional oil and gas, 
the royalty is based on gross 
revenue. The royalty rate 
differs first by product 
category, such as density of 
oil or type of gas (i.e. 
conservation vs. non-
conservation gas) and by 
well age (except for heavy 
oil and conservation gas). 
Then the formulation of the 
royalty rate for a given 
product category differs 
between oil and gas. For oil, 
the royalty rate is sensitive 
mainly to productivity; for 
gas, the royalty is sensitive 
only to price.  
For certain high-cost shale 
gas projects, there is a pre-
payout 2% royalty on gross 
revenue (refer to next 
column). 
For certain high-cost shale 
gas projects, a newly-
introduced net profit 
royalty programme with 
four tiers of royalty rates 
applies: a pre-payout 2% 
royalty on gross revenue, 
and three post-payout tiers 
associated with a royalty 
that is the greater of 5% of 
gross revenue and a 
higher rate of net revenue 
(i.e. 15%, 20%, or 35%, 
depending on the tier 
order). To reach each of 
the three tiers of net 
royalty, a progressive 
return allowance applies.  
 
Saskat-
chewan 
Crown royalties and 
freehold production 
taxes are deductible 
for CIT purposes.  
 
There is also a 
resource surcharge 
under the corporate 
capital tax regime, 
which is deductible 
CIT rate is 12% and 
the tax base matches 
that of the federal 
government. 
 
Crown royalty and freehold 
production tax (FPT) on oil 
and gas are determined 
using formulas containing 
parameters that are adjusted 
monthly by the government. 
Both royalty and FPT are 
sensitive to price and well 
productivity, and differ by 
product in terms of their 
None 
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for CIT purposes. vintage and characteristics 
(e.g. type of product, well 
and location). The FPT is 
lower than the crown royalty 
by a production tax factor 
(PTF), which varies by the 
type of product and ranges 
from 6.9% to 12.5%.  
NF&L Royalties are 
deductible for CIT 
purposes. The 
generic royalty 
regime consists of a 
basic royalty and a 
two-tier net royalty. 
 
Note that 
unsuccessful 
exploration 
expenditure is 
disallowed for the 
purpose of 
calculating royalty. 
CIT rate is 14% and 
the tax base matches 
that of the federal 
government. 
 
Under the generic offshore 
oil royalty structure: a basic 
royalty is charged on gross 
revenue at rates rising from 
1% to 7.5% as cumulative 
production rises and before 
payout of all the project 
costs and the basic gross 
royalty and the compounded 
return allowance are 
exhausted.  
 
Basic royalty is payable over 
the entire production period. 
But after the payout, it is first 
creditable against the Tier I 
net royalty and further 
deductible from the base for 
Tier 2 royalty. 
Two-tier net royalty (20% 
and 10%), along with a 
two-tier return allowance, 
applies after payout. Tier 1 
net royalty applies after all 
the project costs and the 
basic gross royalty and the 
compounded Tier 1 return 
allowance are exhausted. 
Tier 2 royalty becomes 
payable after the payout of 
both gross royalty and Tier 
1 net royalty along with the 
Tier 2 return allowance.  
The return allowance is 5 
percentage points above 
LTBR for Tier 1 and 15 
points above LTBR for 
Tier 2. 
Nova Scotia Royalties are 
deductible for CIT 
purposes.  
The generic offshore 
royalty regime 
consists of a two-tier 
gross-revenue 
royalty and a two-
tier net royalty 
depending on the 
gross and net 
revenue levels 
respectively.  
 
CIT rate is 16% and 
the tax base matches 
that of the federal 
government. 
 
Revenue-based, or gross 
royalty is two-tiered - 2% 
before payout and 5% after 
payout - and deductible for 
calculating the base for the 
net revenue royalty.  
Note that regardless of the 
revenue and profit level 
being reached, the 2% gross 
royalty applies for a 
minimum of 24 months, and 
the 5% gross royalty applies 
for a minimum of 36 months. 
This implies that there is no 
net royalty, or rent tax 
payable for the first 5 years 
after the commencement of 
production.  
Two-tier net royalty rate is 
20% and 30% depending 
on the net revenue tier 
reached.  
Even after the net royalties 
become payable, only the 
greater rate of 5% of gross 
revenue and 20% or 35% 
of net revenue is payable. 
To reach each of the two 
tiers of the net royalty 
scheme, a progressive 
return allowance applies: 
20 percentage points 
above LTBR for Tier 1 and 
45 points above LTBR for 
Tier 2. 
 
 
Table 3 CIT and metallic mining royalty provisions by province as of 2013 
 
 BC AB SK MB ON PQ (6) NB NS NFLD 
Corporate 
Tax 
provisions 
         
Federal Rate 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Prov Rate 10% (3) 10% 12% 12% 10% 11.9% 10% 16% 14% 
Special 
Provincial 
Tax 
provisions 
Prov. 
exploration 
tax credit: 
20% (30% 
in pine 
beetle 
areas) 
  10% Resource 
allowance 
25% of 
profits 
Corporate 
minimum 
tax. 
Develop-
ment costs 
expensed. 
Refundable 
tax credit of 
15-38.75% 
for Quebec 
exploration 
expenses. 
   
Mining 
royalty 
provisions 
         
Tier 1 2% on net 
current 
proceeds 
(fully 
1% of 
pre-
payout 
sales 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2% revenue 
net of 
processing 
and 
transport 
2% of net 
revenue 
15% of 
profit with 
deduction 
of 20% 
before 
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credited) costs 
(exempt first 
two years) 
allowance if 
greater than 
non-Crown 
royalties.  
Tier 2 13% 
 
12% on 
revenue 
net of 
accumu-
lated 
costs 
10%  
(5% on 
sales up 
to C$1 m 
oz or 1 m 
mt) 
17% 10% (5% 
remote 
areas) 
16% 16% in 
excess of 
C$100 k 
15% of 
net 
income 
(if greater 
than first 
tier) 
20%  
Depreciation Additional 
super 
allowance 
of 33% for 
new mine 
expansion 
until 2016. 
15% SL 100% 20%  30% SL or 
100% new 
mine 
assets. 
Processing 
assets: 15% 
SL 
30% New mine 
expansions 
(5% 
minimum) 
and 33% 
other 
assets. 
100% first 
3 years, 
then 30% 
25% (100% 
for new or 
expanded 
mine 
assets) 
Half yr 
convention 
Development 
expenses 
Expensed Expensed 150% 20%  Expensed Expensed Expensed 100% first 
3 years, 
then 30%  
Over life of 
mine 
Exploration Expensed Expensed 150% Expensed 
Offsite 
exploration 
given 150% 
write-off of 
expenditure
over 3-year 
average. 
Expensed Expensed 
(125% for 
north) 
150% 
(except 
mineral 
rights that 
are 
expensed) 
100% first 
3 yrs, 
then 30%  
Expensed 
Processing 
allowance 
Expensed None N/A 20% of 
original cost 
of assets 
(milling, 
smelting 
and 
refining) 
Up to 65% 
of profits 
Asset 
original cost 
- 8% milling 
- 12% 
smelting 
- 16% 
refining 
- 20% North 
Ont. 
Up to 65% 
of profit 
 
Asset 
original cost 
- 7% milling 
- 13% 
smelting 
- 13% 
refining 
Up to 55% 
of profit 
Asset 
original cost 
- 8% milling 
- 15% 
smelting 
- 15% 
refining 
Up to 65% 
of profit 
Asset 
original 
cost 
- 8% 
milling 
- 10% 
smelting 
- 8% 
refining 
Up to 
65% of 
profit 
Asset 
original cost 
- 8% milling 
- 15% 
smelting 
- 8% 
refining 
Up to 65% 
of profit 
Financing 
allowance for 
carry 
forwards 
125% of 
bank rate to 
cumulative 
expenditure 
account 
balance 
None None None None None 8% of un-
depreciated 
base 
None None 
Reclamation 
contributions 
Deductible Deduct- 
ible 
Deduct-
ible 
Deductible Deductible Deductible Deductible N/A Deductible 
Other 
provisions 
 10% 
allowance 
in lieu of 
over-
heads 
10 yr 
holiday 
150%pre-
prodn. 
expenses 
recovered 
before 
royalties 
paid 
New mine 
holiday until 
payback is 
achieved. 
No tax for 
first 3 years 
or C$10 
million (10 
yrs for 
remote 
locations 
Mine-by-
mine 
approach 
for duties. 
Cash refund 
of 16% of 
non-capital 
losses and 
credit of 8% 
for 
exploration 
and 
develop-
ment costs 
15% R&D 
tax credit 
 Max C$2 
m/yr credit 
for 10 years 
Notes: 
1. Federal CIT provisions include royalty deductibility, capital cost deductions for post-production investment (most important 
for tangible assets is class 41 and 41a which provides a minimum 25% Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) rate and up to 100% 
for pre-production expenditure and mine expansions in excess of 5% of sales and also ring-fenced – this provision is being 
phased out by 2020). A 10% investment tax credit for pre-production mining expenditure, including both exploration and 
development expenses that involve base or precious metals, is also being phased out by 2015 (refer to section 127 of the 
Income Tax Act) as well as an Atlantic Investment Tax Credit of 10% being phased out for mining and oil and gas. 
Canadian development expenses are written off at a 30% rate (includes mine shafts after commercial production).  
2. Tax rates used are those fully adopted by 2013.  
3. British Columbia: corporate tax rate may increase depending on Harmonised Sales Tax referendum outcome.  
4. SL signifies straight line depreciation. Otherwise, declining balance.  
5. Flow-through shares enable exploration and development deductions to be flowed through to shareholders. A federal 
investment tax credit is provided equal to 15% of exploration expenditure. Credit rates by province are BC (20%), Manitoba 
(20% or 30%), Ontario (5%) and Saskatchewan (10%). Credits reduce exploration deduction available. 
6. Quebec has undertaken a significant reform of its mining royalty effective 1 January 2014.  
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CIT and extractive industry levies are reported for the years 2008 to 2012 in Tables 4 and 5. 
Data on CIT payable by sector is not available at the provincial level. However, royalties, 
which include cash flow or profit-based levies, are available in provincial budget documents. 
In Canada the primary source of collecting levies on resource rents is through provincial 
royalties and bonus bids, which is consistent with provincial ownership of resources in the 
Canadian constitution. CIT levies are smaller than royalties in part because corporate tax 
policy is focused, at least in principle, in a neutral treatment of different activities, especially 
following the proposals of the 1997 federal Technical Committee on Taxation, which 
recommended the removal of special preferences for certain industries along with corporate 
rate reductions. This reform process has evolved since 2000 with the removal of several 
preferences in extractive and other industries, and a reduction in the average federal-
provincial CIT rate from 43 per cent to 26 per cent. The revenue below reflects both business 
cycle impacts as well as policy changes.  
 
Table 4 CIT payable by extractive resource industry in Canada (federal and provincial), 
2008-2012 (C$ million) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Oil and gas extraction  
and support activities 
Federal 3101 3928 1710 1463 1349 
Provincial 1722 2194 1027 987 1069 
Total 4823 6122 2737 2450 2418 
Mining and quarrying  
(except oil and gas) 
Federal 909 321 644 678 280 
Provincial 636 220 497 571 246 
Total 1545 541 1141 1249 526 
TOTAL 6368 6663 3878 3699 2944 
 
Source: Statistic Canada  
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Table 5 Royalty payments received by Canadian provinces from the extractive 
resource industry, 2008-2012 (C$ million) 
Year/Province 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Alberta1 11271 12176 6892 8555 11802 
British Columbia2 2601 2755 1800 1787 1874 
Saskatchewan3 1515 2273 3369 2108 2829 
Manitoba4 117 137 20 47 57 
Ontario5 193 197 228 145 201 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador6 
1835 2808 1965 2607 3088 
Nova Scotia7 512 458 154 176 113 
New Brunswick 8 13 37 13 19 20 
Quebec9 42 305 365 
Total 18099 20883 14483 15749 20349 
 
Source: Provincial Government Budget (Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec), various years.  
 
Notes: 
1. Royalties for the province of Alberta include natural gas and by-products royalty, crude oil royalty, synthetic crude oil and 
bitumen royalty, bonuses and sales of crown leases, rentals and fees, coal royalty, and freehold mining rights. For 2007/8, 
Royalties are Net Royal Tax Credit; 2008/9: Royalties are Net Royal Tax Credit; 2009/10 Royalties are Net Energy Industry 
Drilling Stimulus Program; 2010/11: Royalties are Net Energy Industry Drilling Stimulus Program; 2011/12: Royalties 
include Net Energy Industry Drilling Stimulus Program. 
2. Royalties for the province of British Columbia include natural gas royalty, bonus bids, fees and rentals, petroleum royalty, 
bonus bid revenue, coal, minerals, metals and other, sale of crown land tenures, oil and gas commission fees and levies.  
3. Royalties for the province of Saskatchewan include crown land sales, natural gas, oil, potash, resource surcharge and 
others. 
4. Royalties for the province of Manitoba include mineral and petroleum fees and royalty, mining tax and mining claim lease. 
5. In the Ontario Budget 'Royalties' line include royalties collected from diamond and some revenue from quarries, but it can 
also include royalties from another sector (such as water and stumpage fees). There is no detailed breakdown of extractive 
resource revenue royalty in the Ontario budget. The mining tax in Ontario Budget is clubbed (rolled in) with the category 
‘other Taxes’. Royalty data for the province of Ontario excludes mining tax. 
6. Royalties for the province of Newfoundland and Labrador include mining tax and offshore royalty, and mining and 
petroleum permits and fees. 
7. Royalties for the province of Nova Scotia include offshore licences, forfeitures, rentals, petroleum licences, royalties - 
petroleum, prior years’ adjustments in respect of other royalties, coal royalty, mineral rentals, lease and grant resources, 
gypsum tax, explorations claims, and other. 
8. Royalties for the province of New Brunswick include royalties on coal, natural gas, oil, potash, and salt. 
9. Royalties for the province of Quebec include mining royalty and credits for losses. The royalties for the period 2006 to 2010 
are the average value as reported in the Quebec provincial budget of 2012/13. 
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Figure 2 Comparing royalties and CIT payable by Canadian extractive resource 
industry, 2008-2012 (C$ billion) 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimate based on Statistic Canada data and Canadian provincial budgets, various years.  
 
2.2.3 Corporate allocation formula in Canada 
 
Canada’s corporate allocation formula has been an important part of its overall approach to 
tax harmonisation. Provinces initially operated their own CITs with income allocated to the 
province according to headquarter permanent establishment, with a tax credit provided for 
any taxes paid in other provinces (Smith 1976). Under the 1942 Tax Rental Agreements, 
gross receipts were initially used as a single apportionment factor to divide income of a 
permanent establishment operating across provincial boundaries (Weiner 2005). With new 
tax rental agreements after the Second World War (1947-52), corporate allocation became 
even more important to businesses as Quebec and Ontario wished to levy independent 
corporate taxes. In 1946 the provinces adopted a common approach based on two factors: 
payroll and gross receipts.  
 
Canada considered the use of physical capital as a factor similar to the US Massachusetts 
formulary apportionment system.35 However, it was felt that a three-factor approach would 
allocate more revenue to the dominant manufacturing provinces (Ontario and Quebec) and 
less to the Atlantic and Western provinces, since the sales factor was based on consumer 
purchases (destination-based) as opposed to production (origin-based) (Technical 
Committee on Business Taxation 1997). However, in later years resource-rich provinces 
were concerned that the corporate allocation formula resulted in too little profit allocated to 
them, given that the destination-based sales factor resulted in the allocation of resource 
profits to consuming provinces like Quebec and Ontario. However, given that difficult 
negotiations over the common formula take place in a zero-sum game, the formula has not 
been changed. 
 
Indeed, the common two-factor approach in Canada has not changed in seventy years. Its 
virtue is that the provinces agree to a common formula, unlike the US where states can 
choose their own weights. Thus, Canadian weights add up to one across provincial and 
                                                 
35  The Massachusetts apportionment formula is comprised of three factors: property, sales and payroll.  
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territorial jurisdictions, with no over- or under-taxation of income. It has resulted in lower 
compliance and administrative costs, as well as fewer economic distortions. However, 
because Canada does not have corporate group taxation, businesses could avoid allocating 
revenue across jurisdictions by setting up separate entities in each province, subject to 
separate accounting rules. Businesses thus have some discretion to avoid corporate 
allocation if it helps reduce tax payments.36 Nonetheless, in 1997 about 45 per cent of 
corporate taxable income was allocated across provinces (with roughly half of non-allocated 
income being represented by small corporate businesses).37 
  
2.2.4 Mechanics of the Canadian approach to corporate allocation 
 
The Canadian allocation approach begins with identifying whether there are permanent 
establishments operating in more than one province. A permanent establishment is a fixed 
place of corporation, which includes an office, branch, oil well, farm, timberland, factory, 
workshop, warehouse or mine. If there is no permanent establishment, the corporation’s 
principal place is where its business is normally conducted. Newfoundland and Labrador and 
Nova Scotia offshore are treated as part of the provinces. 
 
The general formula requires the company’s domestic income to be allocated to each 
province according to an equally-weighted sum of the share of payroll and gross revenue by 
province (specific cases are discussed below):  
 
Y[p] = Y x 1/2 [w(p) + GR(p)] 
 
Y(p) = corporate income allocated to the province p. 
 
Y = national corporate taxable income 
 
w(p) = share of national payroll in province p. 
 
GR(p) = share of national gross revenue in province p.  
 
To determine tax in each province, taxable income is multiplied by the provincial CIT rate. 
Provincial tax credits are subtracted from tax payable to arrive at the final amount. 
 
The gross revenue weight is calculated by excluding interest, dividends, rent and revenue 
from gross revenue. Gross salaries and wages only include employee compensation at the 
permanent establishment, and not contract labour. Benefits are not included.  
 
Special weights apply for specific industries, especially transportation and finance, 
substituting for one or both factors depending on the case. These include insurance (net 
premiums only), banks (loans and deposits instead of gross revenue), trust and loan 
companies (gross revenue only), railway companies (equated track kilometres and gross ton 
kilometres), airlines (capital cost of fixed assets and revenue plane kilometres), grain 
elevators (bushels of grain instead of gross revenue), bus and truck operators (kilometres 
driven instead of gross revenue), ships (port-call-tonnage instead of gross revenue), and 
pipelines (kilometres of pipe instead of gross revenue). 
 
Given the federal role in administering CIT, the issues arising with respect to transfer pricing, 
financial structures and other profit shifting among provinces are of far less consequence 
                                                 
36  Allocation minimises taxes if the weights allocate more income to low-tax rate jurisdictions; e.g. Quebec had a much 
lower CIT than other provinces in the 1980s – companies with sales and payroll primarily in Quebec would prefer 
allocation rather than setting up separate companies in each province. 
37  Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1997: 11.9). 
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compared to international tax planning. Nonetheless, the ability of companies to set up 
subsidiaries in different lines of business provides opportunities for tax planning, although 
transfer pricing is more difficult to use to shift prices due to the federal auditing of tax bases 
on behalf of the provinces.  
 
Income earned by mining and oil and gas companies is allocated across provinces in 
accordance with the general formula. Extractive industries in Canada are therefore treated 
similarly to other industries with respect to extraction, refining or processing, and retail 
operations. The income is allocated across provinces according the payroll and gross 
revenue shares. If separate subsidiaries are established for different operations, allocation 
only applies to those subsidiaries with permanent establishments in multiple provinces. 
 
As for provincial royalties, the corporate income allocation rules are irrelevant in the sense 
that income or sales are typically measured on a project or well basis, and administered by 
energy or mining departments at the provincial level. 
 
2.2.5 UT approaches in the EI sector in the US 
 
The US constitution governs federal and state laws, and federal and state governments 
share taxation powers with the exception of import duties and duties of tonnage which are 
assessed exclusively at the federal level. Within these bounds, the states levy both direct 
and indirect taxes according to their constitutions, laws and regulations. In all the US states 
mineral resources are either owned by the federal government, the state government or by 
private persons. Generally the landowner owns the right to subsurface minerals as well as 
the surface, unless the title has been previously severed. However in some US states, such 
as Louisiana, the state retains title to all water bottoms.38 
 
The US is rich in mineral resources, both fuel and nonfuel. The country is a net exporter of 
nonfuel mineral raw materials, and in 2012 the US mining industry contributed US$15.7 
billion to US GDP (US Department of the Interior/USGS 2013).39 The State of Nevada 
produces nearly 15 per cent of total nonfuel minerals from the US.40 Other significant nonfuel 
mineral-producing states include Arizona (11 per cent), Minnesota (6 per cent), Florida (5 per 
cent) and California (5 per cent) (US Department of the Interior/USGS 2013: 9-10). With the 
exception of coal, the US is a net importer of fuel minerals.41 Crude oil, natural gas and coal 
are produced in more than half the US states, as well as offshore in the Pacific Coast and 
Gulf of Mexico. The top oil-producing states are Texas, Alaska, California and North Dakota; 
the top natural gas-producing states are Texas, Wyoming, Louisiana, Oklahoma and 
Pennsylvania; and the top coal-producing states are Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Pennsylvania and Texas.42 
                                                 
38  La. Rev. Stat. 41:14. 
39  Primary mineral commodities include gold, crushed stone, copper, cement, construction sand and gravel, iron ore, 
molybdenum concentrates, phosphate rock, lime, industrial sand and gravel, soda ash, clays, salt, zinc and silver.  
40  US Department of the Interior/USGS (2013: 9 Table 3). ‘In 2012, 11 States each produced more than US$2 billion worth 
of nonfuel mineral commodities. These states were, in descending order of value - Nevada, Arizona, Minnesota, Florida, 
California, Alaska, Utah, Texas, Missouri, Michigan, and Wyoming. The mineral production of these States accounted 
for 64% of the US total output value’. 
41  In 2011 the country imported twice as much oil as it produced domestically, while net imports of natural gas amounted 
to 6% of the total natural gas consumed during the same period. The US imported over four billion barrels of oil, while 
domestic production was a little over two billion barrels. Gross natural gas imports decreased by about 10% to 3,135 Bcf 
in 2012, the lowest level since 1998. US Energy Information Administration, US Imports by Country of Origin (2011); US 
Natural Gas Exports & Imports 2012 (July 2013). During the same period, however, US net exports of coal totaled 94.2 
million short tons. US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2011, Coal Overview, Table 7.1. 
42  US Energy Information Administration, US Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves 2011 (August 2013); National 
Mining Association (2012). The largest fuel mineral deposits in the US are located in the North Slope of Alaska; the Gulf 
of Mexico; the Williston Basin, which covers parts of the State of Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota; 
Southwestern Wyoming; the Great Eastern Basin, which covers parts of Nevada, Utah and Idaho; and the Appalachian 
Basin and Marcellus Shale along the Northeastern US (US Department of the Interior/USGS National Assessment of Oil 
and Gas Resources Update March 2013). 
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For federally-owned lands, such as the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska and the 
offshore Gulf of Mexico, oil and gas leases are obtained through auction, after which a 
royalty applies to 12.5 per cent of the value onshore production and 16.67 per cent of the 
value offshore production. Coal mining on federal lands is subject to a 12.5 per cent royalty 
on gross value for surface mining and 8 per cent royalty on gross value for subsurface 
mining, while nonfuel mining operations are exempt from federal royalties.43 There is also a 
federal excise tax assessed on coal production at 4.4 per cent of the sales price.44  
 
Under current federal CIT laws, there are various tax preferences for domestic oil, gas and 
coal production.45 Income from oil, gas and coal domestic production benefits from a six per 
cent deduction from income, resulting in a reduced effective CIT rate of 31.9 per cent. 
Exploration and development expenditure, such as intangible drilling and completion costs, 
may be expensed;46 either cost or percentage depletion may be deducted from gross 
income;47 geological and geophysical expenditure may be amortised over two years; 
royalties from coal mining are not treated as ordinary income but instead as capital gains, 
which are subject to a reduced tax rate of 20 per cent; and many of the major oil and gas 
producers have adopted the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) for 
claiming depreciation deductions for tangible assets.48 The US also has an elective loss 
transfer system for CIT, which allows consolidation of the tax base of a corporate group in 
which the parent owns, directly or indirectly, at least 80 per cent of the total voting power and 
value of the stock of its subsidiary.49 As a result, profits can offset losses from various 
projects as well as up/downstream activities within the corporate group. 
 
2.2.6 Extractive industries and state taxation 
 
Unlike Canada, there is no comprehensive federal harmonisation of state taxation. Hence, 
the states have enacted a wide variety of CIT and other EI levies. The states collect royalties 
(usually 12.5 per cent but increasingly higher, up to 18.75 per cent depending on extractive 
capacity) from oil, gas and coal extraction on state-owned lands and water bottoms. In all the 
US states where land is privately-held, extractives royalties are payable to the owner of the 
mineral interest. Some states have minimum royalty statutes, which typically follow the 12.5 
per cent royalty of the federal government, but in many cases there is no statutory minimum. 
In addition to these royalties, states generally assess two additional levies: a CIT or franchise 
tax, and a severance tax. Both the royalty and severance taxes are generally based on the 
gross revenue or production value net of transportation and gas compression costs, but 
many levies remain volume-based. Royalties and/or severance taxes are often deductible for 
federal and state CIT purposes. Because state taxation regimes on the EI sector vary widely, 
two contrasting case studies will be examined – Alaska and Minnesota. Case studies of EI 
taxation regimes in Louisiana, North Dakota and Texas are provided in the Appendix. 
 
2.2.7 Case study: Alaska’s oil and gas sector 
 
The state of Alaska is a leading oil- and nonfuel mineral-producing state – both in terms of 
crude oil, at over 190 million barrels produced annually, and nonfuel minerals such as gold, 
zinc, silver, lead, sand and gravel, valuing over US$3.5 billion and 5 per cent of total US 
                                                 
43  Coal mining operations are subject to a 12.5% royalty for surface mining and 8% for underground mining. There have 
been increasing efforts to change the law exempting certain nonfuel mineral extraction from royalties. See Snyder 
(2013). 
44  IRC Sec 4121. 
45  See US Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, FY 2013, 
Table 7-1, 249. 
46  IRC Sec. 263(a), (c). Under this section, IDC may be capitalised or expensed by irrevocable election. 
47  IRC Sec. 612-613. 
48  IRC Sec. 168; MACRS allows for five years for oil and gas well drilling; off-shore drilling assets; seven years for assets 
used in oil and gas exploration; see also IRS Pub. 946 (2012) Table B-2;  IRS Oil and Gas Handbook, 4.41.1.3.2.4 (10-
01-2005) – Depreciation. 
49  15 USC § 1501 et seq. 
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nonfuel mineral production.50 Companies in the extractives industry of Alaska are subject to 
three primary levies in addition to municipal property taxes: royalty payments, severance 
taxes and conservation charges, and CIT. The statutory minimum for royalty payments for 
the oil and gas extraction on state-owned lands is 12.5 per cent. In addition, minimum royalty 
rates exist for coal and certain nonfuel minerals.51 
 
Severance taxes/charges for oil and gas 
 
Special taxes/charges for the oil and gas sector include the Oil and Gas Petroleum 
Production Tax (PPT); Oil and Gas Property Tax at the rate of two per cent of the market 
value of exploration, production and pipeline production property in the state;52 and Oil 
Conservation Charges totalling 5¢ per barrel produced in the state.53  
 
From 2014 PPT is set at 35 per cent of net value of production (or production tax value) in 
the state.54 The net value of production is determined by the gross value at point of 
production, less deductions for lease expenditure and adjustments to lease expenditure.55 
Gross value at the point of production includes a deduction for the actual costs of 
transportation, except when the shipper of the oil or gas is affiliated with the transport carrier; 
or the contract is not at arm’s length; or there are other reasonable methods of transport.56  
 
Lease expenditure is then subtracted from the gross value. Lease expenditure includes 
ordinary and necessary direct costs upstream of the point of production, and overhead 
expenses for exploring, developing and producing oil or gas deposits in the state.57 Lease 
expenditure does not include depreciation, depletion or amortisation; royalty or production 
payments; taxes measured by net income; interest or financing charges for raising equity or 
debt capital; fines, penalties, arbitration or indemnity costs; acquisition or organisation costs; 
abandonment or clean-up costs; or political lobbying costs. Any other expense incurred 
through internal transfer must be demonstrated by the producer as not exceeding fair market 
value.58 Lease expenditure must then be adjusted by subtracting payments or credits 
received by the producer for other leasehold or management payments; insurance and other 
production-related reimbursements; and amounts received from the sale or transfer of assets 
acquired as a result of the leasehold and oil or gas.59 There are also gross revenue 
exclusions of 20 per cent for certain new production, with an additional credit of US$5 per 
barrel produced.60 For all other production there is a sliding scale, non-transferable tax credit 
of up to US$8 per barrel based on oil prices.61 
 
                                                 
50  A severance tax for the mining industry applies as provided in AS 43.65; however, this analysis will focus on the oil and 
gas sector. 
51  The minimum royalty for coal is 5¢ per ton. AS 38.05.150. 
52  AS 43.56. Oil and gas reserves, leases and other rights to explore and produce, as well as intangible drilling and 
exploration expenditure, are exempt from taxation. A non-refundable credit is given for municipal property taxes paid. 
See also Alaska Tax Division (n.d: 60). 
53  AS 43.55.201; 43.55.300. 
54  See More Alaska Production Act, Ch. 10, S.B. 21, Laws 2013. Before 1 January 2014, the Alaska’s Clear and Equitable 
Share (ACES) tax system applied with a 25% tax rate and an additional progressive tax based on oil/gas prices under 
AS 45.55.011(e). For a comparison of both taxes, see Goldsmith (2014).  
55  AS 43.55.160. 
56  In such cases the Department of Revenue will use the lower of the actual and reasonable costs (based on fair market 
value) to determine the gross value. Reasonable costs are determined by the Department of Revenue using the fair 
market value of like transportation, the fair market value of equally efficient and available alternative modes of 
transportation, or other reasonable methods. Transportation costs fixed by tariff rates that have been adjudicated as just 
and reasonable by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska or another regulatory agency and transportation costs in an 
arm's length transaction paid by parties not affiliated with an owner of the method of transportation shall be considered 
prima facie reasonable. In any case transportation costs do not include charges related to loss or damage of vessels in 
connection with a catastrophic oil discharge. AS 43.55.150. 
57  AS 43.55.165. 
58  AS 43.55.165(e)(12). 
59  AS 43.55.170. 
60  AS 43.55.160(f); A.S. 43.55.024(i). 
61  AS 43.55.024(j). 
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CIT for oil, gas and pipelines sector 
 
For all extractives sectors Alaska’s CIT applies, with a payment of US$10,830 on the first 
US$222,000 of taxable income, and the remaining taxable income subject to a tax rate of 9.4 
per cent.62 Under this regime the CIT base is aggregated based on the unitary business 
principle.63 The unitary business determination is a factual case-by-case analysis: where 
entities are under common control either directly or indirectly, and the activities of the entities 
are contributory and complementary, there is a unitary business.64 Furthermore, if the 
activities of the entities are in the same line of business, if the entities are performing 
different steps in a vertical process, or if there is strong centralised management, there is a 
presumed unitary business.65 Mining companies are cited as an example of a vertically-
integrated business in the Alaska Guide to Returns Based on a Combined Report (Alaska 
Department of Revenue n.d.(a)). The tax base of affiliated groups must also be consolidated 
if they are part of a unitary business.66  
 
For all such taxpayers engaged in a unitary business that derive income from sources within 
and outside of the state, a combined report is required. The oil, gas and pipelines sector is 
subject to worldwide combined reporting, and all other sectors file returns based on water’s 
edge combined reporting.67 In addition to a combined report, consolidated returns are 
allowed and required when filing a federal consolidated return; separate combined reports 
are required for each unique combined (unitary) group represented in the consolidated 
return.68 
 
The tax base is then apportioned based on the proportion of economic factors located within 
the state vis-à-vis outside the state. The mining sector apportionment follows the general 
three-factor formula of sales, property and payroll, while the oil, gas and pipeline sector tax 
base is apportioned by a formula based on sales (including tariffs), property and an 
extraction factor, consisting of total production of barrels of oil plus ⅙ Mcf of natural gas. If 
the taxpayer is engaged in all three subsectors (oil, gas and pipelines), the formula factors 
are sales, property (including intangible drilling and development costs) and the extraction 
factor. If the taxpayer is not involved in the production of oil and gas or gas only, the formula 
factors are property and sales.69 If the taxpayer is not involved in the pipeline transport of oil 
or gas, the formula factors are property and extraction.70  
 
Although Alaska adopted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) in 
1959 and has used the three-factor property, payroll and sales formula since that time, it was 
not until 1978 that the legislature found that the standard formula did not fairly reflect Alaska 
                                                 
62  This bracket and rate applies from 1 January 2014, signed into law on 28 May 2013. See AK S.B. 7, Laws 2013. 
63  See 15 AAC 20.310; Alaska Department of Revenue (n.d(a): 1). 
64  A business is unitary if the entity or entities involved are owned, centrally managed, or controlled, directly or indirectly, 
under one common direction which can be formal or informal, direct or indirect, or if the operation of the portion of the 
business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business outside the state. 15 
AAC 20.310(a). 
65  15 AAC 20.310 at 2. 
66  An affiliated group is defined as a group of two or more corporations in which 50 per cent or more of the voting stock of 
each member of the group is directly or indirectly owned by one or more corporate or non-corporate common owners, or 
by one or more of the members of the group. Foreign affiliates are included when 20% or more of affiliate's average 
property, payroll and sales factors are assigned to a location within the US; the affiliate is a domestic international sales 
corporation; a foreign sales corporation; a corporation that is registered or does business in a country with no income 
tax or 90% less than the US tax rate if 50% or more of the sales, purchases, or payments of income or expenses are 
made to members of the combined group and the corporation does not conduct significant economic activity. AS 
43.20.073. 
67  AS 43.20.144; 43.20.145. One exception is provided through Alaska Stranded Gas Development Act, which provides 
that a company that develops Alaska’s gas under that framework could have a negotiated payment in lieu of other taxes 
(PILT). See A.S. 43.82.  The PILT under the terms of the contract would exempt the payer from CIT (as well as other 
taxes). 
68  See Alaska Department of Revenue (n.d.(b): 3). 
69  AS 43.20.072(c)(1). 
70  AS 43.20.072(c)(2). 
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income for oil and gas corporations. In response, the legislature adopted a law requiring oil 
and gas companies to calculate Alaska taxable income using separate accounting. This 
change was met with such a high level of litigation from taxpayers that three years later the 
legislature modified the apportionment formula for the oil, gas and pipelines sector to include 
an extraction factor. Moreover, it was only in 1991 that the legislature allowed companies to 
use water’s edge apportionment; before 1991 all companies were required to report on a 
worldwide basis. However the oil, gas and pipelines sector was allowed to continue to report 
on a worldwide basis after the change to water’s edge apportionment in 1991 (Alaska Tax 
Division n.d: 26-27). 
 
Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision in Tesoro Corp. v. Alaska solidifying 
the application of worldwide combination of a unitary business and formula apportionment 
with respect to oil and gas companies.71 Tesoro Corporation is a petroleum company, 
headquartered in Texas, and comprised of thirty-three subsidiaries organised into five 
business segments, one of which is based in Alaska. The remaining segments are based in 
Bolivia, Louisiana and Texas. When the exploration and production business segment 
(located in Bolivia and Texas) realised profits of approximately US$200 million from the sale 
of an interest in a gas field and sums from a successful breach of contract claim (which were 
far greater than those of the Alaska retail and marketing segment), Tesoro sought to isolate 
this profitable segment from the Alaska unitary business in order to avoid bringing this 
income into the combined tax base.72 Upon examination of the unitary nature of the 
business, the Court ruled that the exploration and production segment belonged to the 
Alaska unitary business, and, as a result, all the income from the business segment was 
correctly included in the unitary tax base and apportioned to arrive at the Alaska taxable 
income.  
 
This ruling illustrates the sometimes disadvantageous position of taxpayers whose out-of-
state income is included into the Alaska tax base – but only in proportion to the worldwide 
factors of production which are located in the state. On the other hand, if a taxpayer 
experiences a corollary loss, this loss will also offset the Alaska tax base – but only in 
proportion to the worldwide factors of production which are located in the state. When the 
Alaska worldwide combined reporting system converges with other tax systems in third 
jurisdictions, both of these instances may result in either double taxation or double non-
taxation, but only to a limited extent: if a taxpayer in a third jurisdiction experiences a loss, 
thus offsetting taxable income in the third jurisdiction, the taxpayer can also offset the loss 
against the Alaska tax base. However, the amount of this offset is limited to the proportion of 
worldwide factors of production located in Alaska (and vice versa with profit). Apparently from 
the Tesoro ruling, this ‘convergence aspect’ of worldwide combination is a tolerable 
consequence in comparison to the benefit of combining the worldwide tax base of the unitary 
business in the oil, gas and pipelines sector.  
 
In summary, along with CIT, there are three distinct severance taxes for oil and gas 
extraction: a small unit-based conservation charge; an ad valorem property tax; and a net 
value-based production tax, which yields the greatest amount of revenue. Revenue collection 
statistics are shown in Table 6. A comparison of PPT and CIT is shown in Table 7. Although 
both taxes incorporate costs at some level, the bases and scope of consolidation are very 
different. The base of PPT is the net value of in-state production only, while the base of CIT 
is the global profit/loss of the entire unitary business. Thus, PPT operates from the bottom-up 
and requires attribution of costs to in-state operations, while CIT operates from the top-down 
by removing all intra-group transactions to determine the overall profitability of the 
consolidated corporate group. With both perspectives, the tax administration has more 
                                                 
71  Case No. 6838, Alaska Supreme Court (25 October 2013). 
72  Case No. 6838, Alaska Supreme Court (25 October 2013) at 3. 
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information to ensure consistency in cost reporting. In addition, the understanding of in-state 
costs in relation to overall profits can inform the design of more efficient production taxes.  
 
Table 6 Tax revenue from EI sector in Alaska 
Revenue source 
Revenue collection 
(FY 2012 US$ million) 
Petroleum Production Tax73 6,146.1 
State oil and gas rents, royalties, bonuses and interest 2,031.7 
Oil and gas CIT 568.8 
Oil and gas Property Tax 111.2 
Mining License Tax 40.7 
State mining rents and royalties 12.3 
 
Source: Alaska Department of Revenue (2013) 
  
Table 7 Alaska oil and gas CIT and PPT comparison 
Tax 
type 
Base Rate 
Consolidation 
scope 
Deductions Excluded deductions 
PPT Net value of 
production = 
gross value at 
point of 
production 
less 
(deductions 
for lease 
expenditure 
less 
adjustments) 
35% In-state 
production only 
Gross value deductions = 
lower of the actual or 
reasonable costs of 
transportation 
Depreciation, depletion or 
amortisation; royalty or 
production payments; 
interest or financing 
charges for raising equity 
or debt capital; fines, 
penalties, arbitration or 
indemnity costs; acquisition 
or organisation costs; 
abandonment or clean-up 
costs; political lobbying 
costs; taxes measured by 
net income 
Lease expenditure = ordinary 
and necessary upstream costs 
as well as direct costs and 
overhead expenses for 
exploring, development and 
production in the state 
Lease adjustments = 
subtract payments or credits 
received by the producer for 
other leasehold or 
management payments; 
insurance and other 
production-related 
reimbursements; and amounts 
received from the sale or 
transfer of assets acquired as 
a result of the leasehold and 
oil or gas 
CIT Net income US$10,830 on 
first 
US$222,000; 
remaining 
subject to 
9.4% 
Worldwide net 
income of 
consolidated 
business 
apportioned by 
in-state sales 
and tariffs, 
property + 
intangible drilling 
and exploration 
costs and 
extraction 
Same as federal taxable 
income expenses and 
deductions except those in the 
next column  
Taxes based on or 
measured by net income; 
intangible drilling and 
development costs should 
be capitalised and 
depreciated (not 
expensed); depletion 
deducted on a cost basis 
only (not percentage); 
accelerated or bonus 
depreciation not allowed 
 
 
2.2.8 Case study: Minnesota 
 
While Minnesota does not produce fuel minerals, the state is the third largest nonfuel mineral 
producer in the US and produces 75 per cent of total US iron ore totalling 40 million tons 
annually. There are six iron ore operations in the state, which are owned by only three 
companies. These operations extract iron ore from the ground, crush it into a fine powder, 
remove impurities, and then compress it into marketable pellets. The government owns the 
largest share of mineral rights in the state, followed by private owners. The statutory 
                                                 
73  Includes Oil and Gas Conservation Charge receipts. 
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minimum for royalties on leases on state-owned lands range from 3.95-20 per cent for 
metallic (nonferrous) minerals74 and from 11-18¢ per ton for ferrous minerals, depending on 
form, such as ore or pellets, and content.75 
 
Along with royalties, there are five primary levels of tax assessed on mineral production in 
the state: Mining Occupation Tax; Taconite Production Tax; Sales and Use Tax; and Ad 
Valorem Property Tax. In 2011, the state collected US$3.07 in total taxes per ton of taconite 
(Minnesota Revenue (2012: 4). Table 8 describes total revenue to the state from mining.  
 
Table 8 Tax revenue from EI sector in Minnesota 
Tax type 
Revenue collection 
(2011 US$ million) 
Mining rents and royalties (state-owned lands) 156.57 
Taconite Production Tax 79.97 
Sales and Use Tax 24.67 
Mining Occupation Tax 22.05 
Ad Valorem Property Tax 0.898 
Income Tax on mining royalties (6.25% withholding) 0.373 
 
Source: Minnesota Revenue (2012). 
 
Mining Occupation Tax 
 
The Mining Occupation Tax is levied in lieu of CIT and is assessed at the rate of 2.45 per 
cent of taxable income.76 There is a separate calculation of taxable income for ferrous 
minerals or taconite, and all other nonferrous minerals. For nonferrous minerals, taxable 
income equals gross proceeds less deductions. Gross proceeds includes any gain or loss 
recognised from the sale or disposition of assets used in the business in this state. When the 
metal product is used by the producer or sold in a non-arm’s length transaction, for example, 
to an affiliate or wholly-owned smelter, the Department of Revenue determines the gross 
proceeds by reference to published prices.77 
 
For ferrous materials, taxable income is determined by the mine value less allowable 
deductions.78 Mine value is the selling price of iron ore or taconite concentrates at the mine. 
Mine values are published by the Department in an annual Directive. For both ferrous and 
nonferrous materials, deductions are only those expenses necessary to convert raw ores to 
marketable quality. Such expenses include costs associated with refinement, but do not 
include expenses such as transportation, stockpiling, marketing or marine insurance that are 
incurred after marketable ores are produced. 
 
For both minerals, the taxable base comes from only the Minnesota mine and plant. Thus, 
the Occupation Tax is non-unitary. All transfers of minerals are deemed by law as Minnesota 
sales, and, thus, there is no apportionment of the tax base.79 Instead taxpayers are required 
to carve out all gross proceeds and deductions which apply to the state. Moreover, gross 
income and deductions from iron/taconite and other minerals mined and processed at the 
same mine and plant must be calculated separately first, before being combined to render 
profit and loss on the Occupation Tax return. For both ferrous and nonferrous minerals, there 
is a deduction for percentage depletion of 15 per cent for iron ore gross income from the 
                                                 
74  Minn. Stat. 93.25. 
75  Minn. Stat. 93.20. 
76  Minn. Stat. 298.01. 
77  Minn. Stat. 298.016. 
78  Minn. Stat. 298.01, subd.4. 
79  Minn. Stat. 298.01, subd. 4a(c). 
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property (but not exceeding 50 per cent of net income), excluding rents or royalties paid or 
incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the property. 
 
Taconite Production Tax 
 
Taconite Production Tax is assessed in lieu of Ad Valorem Property Tax on taconite land and 
structures used in the production of taconite.80 As of 2013, the tax is assessed at the rate of 
$2.56 per gross dry ton of taconite concentrate. The annual tax rate changes based on GDP 
Implicit Price Deflator. ‘Taxable tons’ are the average tons produced during the current year 
and the previous two production years. There is an additional tax of 10¢ per 2,000 lb on 
tailings.81 ‘Tailings’ refers to the solid and liquid waste materials resulting from the 
beneficiation process. 
 
Sales and Use Tax 
 
Sales and Use Tax is assessed at 6.875 per cent on the sale of tangible personal property or 
services. For the mining industry, exemptions such as industrial production exemption, 
taconite production material exemption, minerals production facilities exemption, and capital 
equipment refund decrease the taxable base.82 
 
Ad Valorem Property Tax 
 
Although the Taconite Production Tax is assessed in lieu of Ad Valorem Property Tax on 
taconite land and structures used in the production of taconite, there are other types of ad 
valorem taxes assessed on the industry, including on auxiliary mining lands for taconite 
operations,83 on unmined taconite,84 on unmined natural iron ore,85 on taconite railroads,86 
and on severed mine interests.87 
 
As Table 8 illustrates, the majority of revenue generated from mining in Minnesota arises 
from volume- or unit-based royalties. Taconite Production Tax – a volume-based tax – yields 
about half the amount generated by royalties. Despite numerous exemptions for the mining 
industry, Sales and Use Tax brings in more than Mining Occupation Tax, which is levied in 
place of CIT. Mining Occupation Tax is the only levy which allows for deductions for 
production costs and percentage depletion. Similar to the other tax instruments, the Mining 
Occupation Tax base only includes in-state income/assets. In this sense, it is a non-unitary 
tax base, confined to Minnesota mine and plant. 
 
 
3  Assessing the unitary approach for the EI 
sector  
 
This paper has described EI tax structure variations at the US and Canadian subnational 
levels to explore whether a UT approach could enhance design and implementation of other 
EI levies. On one hand it has been observed that, although the scope of aggregation varies 
                                                 
80  Minn. Stat. 298.24. 
81  Minn. Stat. 298.24, subd. 2. 
82  Minn. Stat. 297A; See also Minnesota Department of Revenue, Mining – Metals, Minerals, Ores, and Taconite, Sales 
Tax Fact Sheet 147, which provides a list of exempt and taxable items used in the taconite and iron mining industry. 
83  Minn. Stat. 272.01. 
84  Minn. Stat. 298.26. 
85  Minn. Stat. 272.03 et. seq. 
86  Minn. Stat. 270.80 et. seq. 
87  Minn. Stat. 272.039 et. seq. 
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widely, the US and Canadian subnational CIT regimes employ a UT approach by 
aggregating the tax base across jurisdictional borders. However, for other EI levies the base 
is restricted to the source jurisdiction – and sometimes even ring-fenced to the project or 
well. In this section we assess the suitability of a global UT approach in terms of aggregation 
and apportionment of the tax base. We conclude with recommendations in the final section.  
 
3.1 Tax base aggregation 
 
Despite the comparatively smaller contribution to revenue from CIT in the US and Canadian 
subnational tax systems, tax base aggregation and combined reporting present the 
advantage of providing a clearer picture of global investment, production, revenue and 
corporate structures, which aids in understanding the true income and costs borne by private 
producers. These costs are a factor in all types of extractive revenue collection instruments – 
even those that are volume-based, as the royalty rate per unit of production should reflect a 
sharing of profits that accounts for production costs. When governments have a clearer 
understanding of costs, revenue and risks involved in exploiting their natural resources, they 
are able to design more effective EI levies that reflect these costs, revenue and risks without 
deterring investment. Likewise, under rules that aggregate the tax base separate business 
structures no longer offer a tax benefit, either because of the redefinition of the tax base or 
because companies must now combine their business operations onto a single combined tax 
return.88 Hence, private producers can also allocate resources in more efficient ways.  
 
It is important to consider carefully the level at which accounts are aggregated to define the 
tax base. When tax base aggregation and reporting is limited to the legal entity, as in the 
case of the Canadian provinces, the scope of this informational advantage drastically 
decreases. On the other hand, a worldwide system of combined reporting, as in the case of 
the oil, gas and pipeline sector in Alaska, may increase the information and reporting 
requirements for firms – however note that all intragroup transactions and their related 
reporting would be eliminated. Worldwide tax base aggregation allows global offsetting of 
losses, which is significant due to the large upfront costs in the EI sector. This could enable 
countries to tax an apportioned share of worldwide profit when the firm’s local projects are 
still in a start-up phase, but by the same token would mean accepting a lower tax base in a 
period when local production might be booming. Where the firms concerned are large and 
internationally diversified this may help the source country ensure more stable revenue, as 
tax revenue more directly linked to world market prices is vulnerable to the often severe 
fluctuations in those prices. However, companies may find this difficult to accept and, as the 
Tesoro case from Alaska illustrates, they may contest the consolidation of gains made in 
other jurisdictions on the grounds that they are not part of an integrated or unitary business.89 
Therefore, a unitary approach based on worldwide consolidation may be more suited to CIT 
alone and not applied to all EI levies, and might be considered as an alternative to a pre-
production levy such as a signature bonus. 
  
A rent/profit-related EI levy could be ring-fenced and all transfers of the extracted mineral 
taxed at source. This system would satisfy source entitlement concerns and perhaps involve 
a simpler reporting scheme. However, ring-fencing may introduce more complexity since 
costs (which are usually incurred at higher levels in a vertically-integrated firm) must be 
segregated and an appropriate proportion attributed to a specific project. This complexity 
would incur increased compliance costs for private producers, as well as require increased 
administration and expertise by a government to establish appropriate prices and costs. 
Moreover, without an understanding of overall costs and revenue generated by the firm as a 
whole, the government may not be able to establish appropriate prices and costs accurately. 
                                                 
88  This observation has been made regarding the Revised Texas Franchise (Business Margin) Tax. See Texas Taxpayers 
and Research Association (2011). 
89  See Section 2.2.7. 
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In this regard, a unitary CIT used in combination with a ring-fenced EI levy could compensate 
for such informational deficits. 
 
If used in combination with other source-based EI levies a unitary CIT alters the balance of 
ex ante risk between the government and the private producer, because it allows global loss 
offsetting. This advantage of a UT approach to CIT may have important effects on 
investment decisions. Given the volatility of world prices, variability of mineral quality and 
high potential of profit, a ring-fencing approach to all EI levies may be more successful in a 
smaller and more stable extractives subsector, such as iron in the case of Minnesota, where 
the Taconite Occupation Tax is restricted to Minnesota mine and plant. In most other cases 
where the above factors typically dominate, a ring-fenced EI levy complemented by a 
worldwide unitary CIT could serve better in more efficient design and administration of EI 
levies. 
 
3.2 Tax base apportionment 
 
When a government adopts a global unitary approach to company taxation of the EI sector, 
another important consideration is apportionment of the tax base. The unitary approach used 
in Canada allocates corporate income through a formula of two factors: sales by destination 
and payroll. Although there are special formula rules for certain industries, the EI sector falls 
under the general allocation formula – the effect is to spread EI tax revenue among the 
provinces. As applied to resource-rich provinces this formula is not very advantageous: sales 
by destination attributes the revenue from minerals to other consuming provinces (away from 
the source state), and, due to its capital-intensive nature, the EI sector requires 
comparatively fewer human resources than most other industries. The single-sales by 
destination formula, now adopted by sixteen US states, would attribute away all revenue of 
minerals sold to consumers outside of the state. The Massachusetts three-factor formula, 
once dominant in the US states but now only used by twelve states, incorporates a factor for 
tangible assets which would include tangible assets used in the EI sector but would continue 
to attribute sales of the minerals away from the state of production when the mineral is sold 
to out-of-state consumers. This is often the case with integrated economies where minerals 
may be extracted from the source state and shipped out-of-state for processing, refinement 
and manufacturing. It is also the case in some developing countries where minerals 
extracted from the source state are generally shipped abroad for processing. 
 
In response, some US states have used more aggressive means to capture mineral revenue 
in the CIT tax base. Louisiana attributes all mineral revenue to in-state sources by excluding 
mineral revenue from all other apportionable corporate income. Before repealing its CIT for 
the taconite industry, Minnesota deemed all sales (regardless of the location of the 
purchaser) as Minnesota sales in its apportionment formula. For the past three decades, 
Alaska has used a special formula for the oil, gas and pipelines sector that includes an 
extraction factor, consisting of total production of barrels of oil plus ⅙ Mcf of natural gas. If 
the taxpayer is engaged in all three subsectors (oil, gas and pipelines), the formula factors 
are sales (by destination), property (including intangible drilling and development costs) and 
the extraction factor. If the taxpayer is not involved in the production of oil and gas or of gas 
only, the formula factors are property and sales by destination. Another way for source-states 
to capture mineral revenue under a formulary apportionment scheme would be to adopt an 
origin-based sales factor, as used in the apportionment formulas in the Swiss cantons (Siu et 
al. 2014). Due to the prominent source entitlement concerns in the EI sector, a modification 
of the general apportionment formula may be necessary – especially as regards the sales 
factor, because a destination-based sales factor shifts tax base from EI away from the 
source state. Global agreement on such a formula would be ideal in reducing competing 
claims on tax jurisdiction. 
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4  Summary of recommendations 
 
Given the advantages and limitations of a UT approach as applied to the EI sector, including 
the very real concerns of developing country source jurisdictions with potential abuse of 
global offsetting of company profits, a unitary CIT should not be used in isolation or be 
employed as the dominant source of EI revenue. Instead, a unitary CIT is best used in 
combination with other rent/profit-related EI levies, because of its informational and risk-
aligning advantages. At the same time, the rent/profit-related EI levies should be assessed 
on a more limited base, such as source jurisdiction, in order to alleviate source entitlement 
concerns. Within this context, a unitary CIT is recommended because it enables more 
effective design and administration of all taxes on the EI sector in the following ways:90  
 
 A unitary CIT enables better design of other rent/profit-related EI levies that require a 
clearer picture of revenue, costs and risks borne by the industry. 
 A unitary CIT increases the effectiveness of implementation and enforcement of all EI 
levies because the information from the worldwide combined report, which is top-down, 
can serve as backstop to cost and revenue reporting under other EI levies that require 
separate accounting, which is bottom-up. 
 A unitary approach to CIT can be more favourable for investment because it allows 
global offsetting of corporate losses.  
 Worldwide combined reporting under a global unitary approach aligns with current reform 
initiatives such as EITI and CbCR. 
 Finally, a specialised ‘production volume’ factor or a source-based sales factor could be 
used in the apportionment formula to measure business activity in the extractives sector 
more accurately, as well as to satisfy source entitlement concerns.  
                                                 
90  A unitary approach to CIT requires international cooperation to make it work as efficiently and fair as possible. See Siu 
et al. 2014: 83). 
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Appendix 
 
A1 Case study: Louisiana 
 
Louisiana is ranked second nationally in gas production, and seventh in oil production. In 
2013 the state received approximately US$1.5 billion in revenue from its mineral wealth.91 
For state-owned lands and water bottoms, there is a minimum royalty of one-eighth (or one-
sixth for school boards only).92  
 
Natural Resources Severance Tax 
 
A Natural Resources Severance Tax is levied on the extraction of all natural resources, with 
oil and gas collection accounting for almost 92 per cent of all severance tax collection. Tax 
rates vary by production capacity of the well, but the large majority (approximately 85-95 per 
cent) of oil and gas severance tax collection are generated from capable wells. The full rate 
for gas for 2013/14 is 11.8¢ per thousand cubic feet (Mcf).93 This rate is adjusted annually 
against a base rate of 7¢ per Mcf.94  
 
The full rate for crude oil as well as condensate is 12.5 per cent of value at the time and 
place of severance, less a 25¢ per barrel deduction for transportation.95 The value is 
determined by the higher of the gross receipts from the first purchaser less any 
transportation fees received, or the posted field price. If there is no posted field price or the 
first purchase is not an arm’s length transaction, the value of gross income must be 
consistent with gross income declared for percentage depletion purposes on the taxpayer’s 
CIT return.96 Severance taxes paid on royalty shares are also deductible against royalty 
payments for mineral leases on state-owned lands and water bottoms. 
 
Corporation Income and Franchise Taxes 
 
All corporations in Louisiana are subject to Corporation Income and Franchise Taxes. Under 
CIT, taxpayers with net incomes over US$200,000 are taxed at the rate of 8 per cent.97 For 
multistate businesses separate reporting at the legal entity level is required, and no 
consolidated returns are allowed even if filing a federal consolidated return.98 As a result, 
Louisiana law does not refer to the concept of a unitary business in its laws or regulations. 
Thus, much like the Canadian provinces, the level of tax base consolidation for CIT is limited 
to domestic cross-border business activities within the corporate entity. Moreover, income 
from mineral interests and oil payments is allocated to in-state income through allocation 
rules as described below.  
 
                                                 
91  State of Louisiana, Department of Natural Resources, Technology Assessment Division, Energy Facts and Figures, 
2013. 
92  La. Rev. Stat. 30:127. 
93  La. Rev. Stat. 47:633(9).  
94  The Department adjusts a base rate of 7¢ per Mcf annually based on a fraction, the numerator of which is the average 
of the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) Henry Hub settled price on the last trading day for the month, as 
reported in the Wall Street Journal for the previous 12-month period ending on 31 March, and the denominator of which 
is the average of the monthly average spot market prices of gas fuels delivered into the pipelines in Louisiana as 
reported by the Natural Gas Clearing House for the 12-month period ending 31 March 1990 (1.7446 US$/MMBTU). La. 
Rev. Stat. 47: 633(9). 
95  LAC 61:1.2903A(h).  Charges for trucking, barging and pipeline fees actually charged the producer may be deducted. 
However, where the producer transports the oil and/or condensate by his own facilities, US$0.25 per barrel shall be 
deemed to be a reasonable charge. 
96  See La. Rev. Stat. 47:158(c). 
97  La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.12(5). ‘Louisiana net income’ is defined as net income earned within or derived from sources 
within Louisiana. La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.67. 
98  La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.480. 
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‘Louisiana net income’ is determined by allocation and apportionment of gross income and 
allowable deductions.99 First, certain items of gross income are directly allocated to the state 
in which they are earned. Income from (or gains from the sale of) in-state mineral lease rents 
and royalties, oil payments or other mineral interests, as well as income from construction on 
in-state mineral properties, is directly allocated to Louisiana gross income.100 All losses, 
expenses and deductions, including intangible drilling and development costs as well as a 
deduction for depletion (the greater of cost or depletion at 22 per cent of gross income),101 
which are directly attributable to allocable gross income, are then subtracted.  
 
The remaining amount is gross apportionable income. All losses, expenses and deductions 
are then subtracted to arrive at net apportionable income.102 The apportionment rules 
explicitly exclude taxpayers whose income is primarily derived from the production or sale of 
unrefined oil or gas and integrated oil companies as defined by the IRC.103 Thus, despite the 
cross-border merging of the apportionable corporate tax base, mineral profits avoid 
apportionment because they are allocated to the source state before apportionment. 
 
Corporation Franchise Tax is also assessed at a rate of 0.3 per cent on corporations whose 
total capital stock, surplus and undivided profits exceed US$300,000.104 If business is 
conducted in other states, allocation and apportionment rules apply; however, as with CIT, 
in-state mineral lease rents and royalties, oil payments or other mineral interests are directly 
allocated to Louisiana,105 and taxpayers whose income is primarily derived from the 
production or sale of unrefined oil or gas and integrated oil companies as defined by the IRC 
are excluded from apportionment.106 Thus, again, mineral interests in the Corporate 
Franchise Tax base avoid apportionment and are allocated to the Louisiana tax base. 
 
As Table 9 below illustrates, the majority of mineral revenue arises from severance tax 
collection from oil extraction. Because data on CIT and Franchise Tax collection for the oil 
and gas industry are not segregated from overall collection, comparability analysis on the 
basis of revenue collection is not possible in this case study.107 However, total CIT and 
Franchise Tax collection for 2013 was approximately three-quarters of Oil Severance Tax 
collection for the same period. Despite the use of formulary apportionment in the overall CIT 
and Franchise Tax, all mineral revenue is attributed to in-state sources by excluding mineral 
revenue from apportionable income. As a result, there is no aggregation of the mineral 
revenue tax base. This feature of the tax system appeals to source entitlement concerns and 
eases administration. 
 
                                                 
99  La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.77. 
100  Rents and royalties from immovable and corporeal movable property are allocated to the state where the property is 
located when the income is derived. La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.93. Under this provision, income from (or net profit from the 
sale of) a mineral lease, royalty interest, oil payment, or other mineral interest is allocated to the state or states in which 
the property subject to such mineral interest is situated. La. Rev. State. 47:287.92B(1); La. Admin. Code 61:I, Sec. 
1134D(4)(b). Income from construction, repair or other similar services is also directly allocated to the state where the 
work is done. La. Admin. Code 61:I, Sec. 1130A(3)(b). Under this provision, ‘other similar services’ means any work that 
has as its purpose the improvement of immovable property, and includes the drilling of a well on a mineral property, 
whether under lease or not. La. Rev. State. 47:287.92B(4); La. Admin. Code 61:I, Sec. 1130A(4)(b). 
101  La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.743-745. 
102  La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.94. 
103  La. Rev. Stat. 47:287.95(2)(c)(ii)-(iii). 
104  La. Rev. Stat. 47:601. 
105  La. Admin. Code 61:I, Sec. 306A(1)(e)(i). 
106  La. Rev. Stat. 47:606A(3)(c)(i), (iii). 
107  Louisiana Corporation Income Tax collection in 2013 was US$427,493,441.86, and Corporation Franchise Tax 
collection for the same period was US$142,036,814.39, for a total of US$569,530,256.25. See Louisiana Department of 
Revenue, Statistical Reports, Monthly Statements of Net Collections and Distributions (2013). Segregated data for oil 
and gas companies was not made available by the Department.   
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Table 9 Louisiana oil and gas revenue 
Revenue source Revenue   
(FY 2013  
US$ million) 
Oil Severance Tax 761.75 
State oil royalties 384.28 
State gas royalties 159.47 
Gas Severance Tax 99.45 
Bonuses, rentals and royalty overrides 38.89 
 
Source: State of Louisiana, Department of Natural Resources, Technology Assessment Division, Energy Facts and Figures, 
2013. 
 
A2 Case study: North Dakota 
 
North Dakota is the second largest producer of oil in the United States, the tenth-ranked 
producer of coal, and eighteenth in gas production. The state produced 243.1 million barrels 
of oil in 2012, along with 27.5 million tons of lignite coal and 258 billion cubic feet of natural 
gas.108 Currently the state leases over 800,000 acres of land for gas and oil production, with 
state royalty rates varying between 16.67 per cent and 18.75 per cent based on the county of 
the lease.109 Over 700 acres of state land is also leased for coal mining. Mineral extraction is 
subject to three primary levels of taxation in the state: Severance Taxes, a Sales and Use 
Tax and the CIT. 
 
Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax 
 
Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax is assessed in lieu of the Ad Valorem Property Tax.110 For 
oil production the tax rate is 5 per cent on gross value at the well.111 Gross value at the well 
is the price paid for the oil under an arm's length contract between the producer and the 
purchaser, less, when applicable, transportation costs associated with moving the oil from 
the point of production to the point of sale under the contract.112 For gas production, the tax is 
assessed on each unit of one thousand cubic feet (Mcf).113 The gas tax rate is set each June 
by the State Tax Commissioner on the basis of the gas fuels producer price index. For the 
fiscal year beginning 1 July 2013, through 30 June 2014, the gas production rate is 8.33¢ per 
Mcf.114 
 
Oil Extraction Tax 
 
The Oil Extraction Tax is an excise tax assessed on oil extraction at the rate of 6.5 per cent 
of gross value at the well. A lower rate of 4 per cent of gross value at the well applies to 
certain new wells and recovery projects, where the average price of a barrel of crude oil for 
any consecutive five-month period of any year is lower than the stated trigger price.115 The 
                                                 
108  US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, Coal Production and Number of Mines by State and 
Coal Rank, 2012, Table 6.1; North Dakota Petroleum Council, North Dakota Oil and Gas Industry Facts and Figures 
(2013). 
109  See ND Department of Trust Lands (2013); ND Department of Trust Lands, ND Oil and Gas Lease Auction, November 
05, 2013, at 9.00 am CT, North Dakota State Capitol House Chambers. 
110  NDCC Sec. 57-51-03. 
111  NDCC Sec. 57-51-02. The tax is also assessed on royalty interests. 
112  NDCC Sec. 57-51-02.3. In the absence of an arm's-length contract, the gross value at the well for oil is established by 
other arm’s length contract prices paid for oil, either with the taxpayer or other parties for like kind oil; if none is 
available, the price is based on the posted field price of like kind oil with adjustments for transportation costs. In 
addition, transportation costs are the actual costs incurred in an arm’s length contract or an established common carrier 
rate with the North Dakota public service commission. See NDCC Sec. 57-51.01(12).  
113  NDCC Sec. 57-51-02.2. The tax is also assessed on royalty interests. 
114  North Dakota, Office of the State Tax Commissioner, Gas Tax Rate Notice, 1 June 2013. 
115  NDCC Sec. 57-51.1-02. 
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trigger price is determined by a base rate of US$35.50 adjusted annually for inflation.116 For 
calendar year 2014, the oil trigger price is US$52.06.117 Exemption categories include 
stripper oil wells, initial production periods and various oil recovery projects.118 
 
Sales and Use Tax 
 
A Sales and Use Tax of 5 per cent is assessed on all taxable purchases and sales within the 
state.119 However, the sale of natural gas, coal and other heating fuels, along with the 
purchase and sale of property used to compress, process, gather or refine natural gas, is 
exempt from Sales Tax.120 Additionally, initial sales of beneficiated coal, along with 
machinery and equipment used to produce coal from a new mine and materials used to 
construct a facility for coal gasification by-product processing, are also exempt from Sales 
Tax.121 Despite these exemptions, almost 20 per cent of all taxable sales and purchases 
occur in the mining and oil extraction industry.122  
 
Coal Severance Tax 
 
In FY 2013, almost 28 million tons of coal were produced in the state. The Coal Severance 
Tax rate is 37.5¢ per ton of coal extracted, and is imposed in lieu of all Sales and Use 
Taxes.123 An additional tax of 2¢ per ton for a special lignite research fund also applies.124 
There are exemptions and reductions on coal used for heating purposes, coal used in certain 
types of cogeneration and agricultural plants, and coal mined for out-of-state shipment.125 
There is also a special Potash Tax scheme, but as there are no active mining operations this 
tax will not be discussed.126 
 
Coal Conversion Facilities Tax 
 
Facilities that process or convert coal and electrical generating plants are subject to a Coal 
Conversion Facilities Tax.127 For coal conversion facilities, the tax is assessed at the rate of 
4.1 per cent of gross receipts, except for amounts received for the sale of a capital asset and 
production of synthetic natural gas in excess of 110 million cubic feet per day. For electrical 
generating plants that have a single generating unit with the capacity of 10,000 kw or more, 
two levies apply. One levy is .65 millionths times 60 per cent of installed capacity times the 
number of hours in the taxable period. The other levy is .25 millionths per kwh of electricity 
produced for sale. 
 
Corporate Income Tax 
 
All companies in the extractives sector in North Dakota are subject to CIT. A top rate of 4.53 
per cent applies to net income of US$50,000 or more.128 Corporations engaged in business 
within and without the state may be taxed only on such income as is derived from business 
transacted and property located within this state.129 The determination of whether the 
                                                 
116  NDCC Sec. 57-51.1-01 (12). 
117  ND Office of the State Tax Commissioner, Annual Oil Trigger Price Adjustment Notice, 31 December 2013.  
118  NDCC Sec. 57-51.1-03. 
119  NDCC Sec. 57-39.2-01. 
120  NDCC Sec. 57-39.2-04; 57-39.2-04.5 
121  NDCC Sec. 57-39.2-04.8; there is a limitation of US$5 million; NDCC Sec. 57-39.2-04.11. 
122  See ND Office of the State Tax Commissioner (2013: 18). 
123  NDCC Sec. 57-61-01. 
124  NDCC Sec. 57-61-01.5. 
125  NDCC Sec. 57-61-01.1; 57-61-01.4; 57-61-01.4; 57-61-01.7. 
126  See NDCC Sec. 57-65; ND Department of Trust Lands (2013: 9). 
127  NDCC Sec. 57-60-02. 
128  NDCC Sec. 57-38-30. 
129  NDCC Sec. 57-38-14. 
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activities of the taxpayer constitute a single trade or business is a factual, case-by-case 
analysis; however, a single trade or business will be deemed if there is evidence to indicate 
that the business segments are integrated with, dependent upon, or contribute to each other 
and the operations of the taxpayer as a whole.130 A worldwide combined report is mandated 
for the entire business income of such trade or business if more than 50 per cent common 
ownership exists, and is apportioned according to a three-factor formula of property, payroll 
and sales. Intangible drilling and development costs incurred by oil and gas producing 
companies in connection with oil and gas properties must be included in the property 
factor.131 
 
A water’s edge election may be made by taxpayers, in which only US-based companies, with 
the exception of certain corporations, combine income or loss to establish the tax base.132 
The apportionment factors are the same as for the worldwide combined report, except that 
the denominators of the factors are only those factors of all the companies included in the 
water’s edge group. The water’s edge election is binding for five consecutive years. If the 
election is made, a corporation is subject to a 3.5 per cent surtax on its North Dakota taxable 
income.133 Moreover, two or more North Dakota domestic corporations affiliated as a parent 
and a subsidiary that file a federal consolidated return must file a combined report and a 
consolidated return. 
 
Table 10 illustrates that collection from Oil Extraction Tax and the Oil and Gas Gross 
Production Tax compromise the majority of mineral revenue. CIT and Sales Tax is assessed 
on companies in the extractive industries; however, because data on CIT and Sales and Use 
Tax collection for this sector is not segregated from overall collection, comparability analysis 
on the basis of revenue collection is not possible in this case study. Nevertheless, total CIT 
collection for all industries for the same period as collection in Table 10 does not exceed 
US$386 million. Thus, despite the broader degree of consolidation of the CIT base, in terms 
of overall mineral revenue CIT collection from the mineral sector is not substantial. The 
system of worldwide combined reporting employed by North Dakota may be more useful in 
terms of its provision of information on in-state costs as they relate to the unitary business. 
Moreover, the surtax of 3.5 per cent (in addition to the top rate of 4.53 per cent), imposed on 
taxpayers reporting at the domestic level only, may incentivise a broader scope of 
consolidation and reporting.  
 
Table 10 North Dakota oil and gas revenue 
Revenue source Revenue   
(US$ million  
2011-2013 FY biennium) 
Oil Extraction Tax 2,142.49 
Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax  1,926.05 
State oil and gas royalties 340.36 
Oil and gas bonuses 192.75 
Coal Conversion Tax 50.37 
Coal Severance Tax 21.98 
 
Source: ND Office of the State Tax Commissioner (2013); ND Department of Trust Lands (2013). 
                                                 
130  NDAC Rule 81-03-09-04. 
131  Intangible drilling and development costs include such elements as wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, draining, road building, 
surveying, geological works, construction of derricks, tanks, pipelines and other physical structures necessary for the 
drilling of wells and their preparation for the production of oil and gas, and supplies incident to and necessary for the 
drilling of wells and clearing of ground. NDAC Rule 81-03-09-21.1. 
132  This election generally requires that corporations with more than 50% of their stock owned or controlled by the same 
interests (directly or indirectly) are in the water’s edge group, along with domestic international sales corporations, 
foreign sales corporations, export trade corporations, foreign corporations deriving gain or loss from disposition of a 
United States real property interest, and any foreign corporation where more than 20% of the average of its property, 
payroll, and sales factors are located in the US. 
133  North Dakota, Corporate Income Tax Return, Form 40, Instructions. 
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A3 Case study: Texas 
 
Texas is the top-ranked oil- and gas-producing state in the US. The state is also ranked fifth 
in coal production and eighth in nonfuel mineral production. State revenue from oil and gas 
production taxes reached nearly US$4.5 billion for FY 2013.134 Although much of the oil and 
gas interests in the state are privately owned, royalties, bonuses and rentals from oil and gas 
leases on state lands generate approximately US$1.4 billion per year (see Table 11). The 
minimum royalty rate for oil and gas leases is 12.5 per cent of gross production or market 
value;135 and for coal the minimum rate is 6.25 per cent of value.136 
 
Natural Gas Production and Regulation Taxes 
 
In 2011, Natural Gas Tax collection was US$1.1 billion, making up 2.9 per cent of total state 
tax collection (Legislative Budget Board 2013: 73). An Oil Production Tax is assessed on the 
production of natural gas at the rate of 7.5 per cent of market value.137 For many drilling 
operations the tax rate on natural gas production is reduced to zero during the first ten years 
of production, or until the site recovers half its drilling and completion costs due to the high-
cost gas rate reduction.138 Condensate recovered from gas is taxed at 4.6 per cent of market 
value or 4.6¢ per barrel, whichever is higher.139  
 
The market value of gas is its value at the mouth of the well, and is determined by 
subtracting actual marketing costs from gross cash receipts from the sale of the gas. Gross 
cash receipts include payments made to the producer and any other payments in connection 
with any judgment, compromise or settlement agreement relating to the recovery of the 
contract price of gas produced.140 However, gross cash receipts do not include payments for 
gas if the gas is never produced and delivered, reimbursement for litigation-related 
expenses, and contract termination or amendment fees except for provisions affecting the 
purchase price.141 Marketing costs are expenses incurred by the producer to get the gas from 
the mouth of the well to the market, including compressing, dehydrating, sweetening and 
delivery costs. However, marketing costs do not include production costs, costs incurred in 
normal lease separation of the oil or condensate, or insurance premiums on the marketing 
facility.142  
 
In addition to the Natural Gas Production Tax, an Oil Field Clean up Regulatory Fee of 1/15 of 
1¢ on each Mcf of natural gas is levied.143 
 
Oil Production and Regulation Taxes 
 
An Oil Production Tax is assessed on the production of oil on the greater of 4.6 per cent of 
market value of the oil produced in the state, or 4.6¢ per barrel of oil produced in the state.144 
                                                 
134  Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Annual Cash Report, 2013, p. 5. 
135  Tex. NRC Sec. 52.022. 
136  Tex. NRC Sec. 53.018. 
137  Tex. TC Sec. 201.051-.052. Both producers and holders of royalty interests are liable for this tax. 
138  Tex. TC Sec. 201.057.  Government reports indicate that from 2010/11, the value of the rate reduction was worth close 
to US$1.0 billion per year and resulted in a loss of over half of potential total natural gas production tax revenue, making 
it the single largest exemption from either the oil or gas severance tax (Legislative Budget Board 2013: 80). 
139  Tex. TC Sec. 201.055. 
140  Tex. Admin. Code, Title 34, Part 1, Ch.3, Sub.B Rule §3.20(b). 
141  Tex. Admin. Code, Title 34, Part 1, Ch.3, Sub.B Rule §3.20(b) 
142  Tex. TC Sec. 201.101. In addition, marketing costs are determined by adding a reasonable charge for depreciation of 
the marketing facility being used, provided that, if the facility is rented, the actual rental fee is added; a return on the 
producer-owned investment equal to 6% per year on the average depreciable balance; costs of direct or allocated 
labour associated with the marketing facility; costs of materials, supplies, maintenance, repairs and fuel associated with 
the marketing facility; and ad valorem taxes paid on the marketing facility. 
143  Tex. NRC Sec. 81.117. 
144  Tex. TC Sec. 202.051-.052. Both producers and holders of royalty interests are liable for this tax. 
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For enhanced oil recovery projects, there is a reduced rate of 2.3 per cent on oil produced 
from a new enhanced oil recovery project.145 The market value of oil is the actual market 
value plus any bonus, premium, or other thing of value paid for the oil.146 In addition to Oil 
Production Tax, an Oil Regulation Tax is assessed at 3/16 of 1¢ on each barrel of oil,147 as 
well as an Oil Field Clean-up Regulatory Fee of 5/8 of 1¢ on each barrel of oil.148 
 
Sales Tax 
 
The Texas state Sales and Use Tax rate is 6.25 per cent, but local taxing jurisdictions, 
including cities, counties, special purpose districts and transit authorities may also impose 
Sales and Use Tax up to 2 per cent for a total maximum combined rate of 8.25 per cent. For 
the oil and gas industry there are a number of exemptions from Sales Tax. Crude oil, which 
is taxed under the Oil Production Tax, is exempt.149 Other Sales Tax exemptions include: 
natural gas, which is taxed as a motor fuel;150 equipment used out-of-state for mineral 
exploration or production;151 equipment used to capture, transport and sequester carbon 
dioxide as part of an enhanced oil recovery project;152 and equipment used to process, 
reuse, and recycle wastewater that will be used in fracturing work at an oil or gas well.153 
Despite these exemptions, much of the equipment purchased by oil and gas companies, 
such as drilling and pumping equipment and storage tanks, is subject to Sales Tax. In 2011, 
Sales Tax revenue related to oil and gas extraction generated the state an additional 
US$489.1 million, or 2.3 per cent of all Sales Tax revenue (Legislative Budget Board 2013: 
76). 
 
Property Tax 
 
Oil and natural gas producers are also subject to Property Taxes on all real and tangible 
property located, used or owned by taxpayers residing in the state.154 There are exemptions 
for all mineral interests on public property,155 as well as for offshore drilling equipment not in 
use.156 However, despite these exemptions, in FY 2011 taxable values of oil, gas and other 
mineral property (including the value of minerals in the ground) exceeded US$1 trillion 
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2012: 4-5).157 Because Property Taxes, which are 
often assessed at the local levels, vary, and the statewide average local Property Tax rate is 
roughly 2.1 per cent, we estimate a total maximum Property Tax levy of US$2.25 billion.158  
 
                                                 
145  Tex. T.C. Sec. 202.052. There are exemptions for oil and gas from previously inactive wells, hydrocarbons from terra 
wells, oil and gas from reactivated orphaned wells, oil incidentally produced from the production of geothermal energy. 
Additionally, there are credits for incremental production techniques, low-producing oil leases, and enhanced efficiency 
equipment.  
146  Tex. T.C. Sec. 202.053. 
147  Tex. N.R.C. Sec. 81.111. 
148  Tex. N.R.C. Sec. 81.116. 
149  Tex. T.C. Sec. 151.308.  
150  Tex. T.C. Sec. 151.308.  
151  Tex. T.C. Sec. 151.324. 
152  Tex. T.C. Sec. 151.334. 
153  Tex. T.C. Sec. 151.355. 
154  Tex. T.C. Sec. 11.01. 
155  Tex. T.C. Sec. 11.11. 
156  Tex. T.C. Sec. 11.271. 
157  Oil, gas and minerals property includes producing and non-producing wells, all other minerals and mineral interests and 
equipment used to bring the oil and gas to the surface. 
158  However, this amount may be slightly overstated, as most oil/gas production takes place in rural areas where property 
taxes are lower. 
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Revised Franchise (Business Margin) Tax 
 
The Revised Franchise (Business Margin) Tax is not a traditional CIT: it is a hybrid between 
a tax on gross receipts and a tax on net income. The base of the Business Margin Tax is 
total revenue159 less the greater of US$1 million, 30 per cent of revenue, cost of goods sold 
or employee compensation.160 The rate for Business Margin Tax is 0.5 per cent for 
wholesalers and retailers, and 1 per cent for all other taxpayers.161 However, for the tax years 
2014 and 2015 the rates have been reduced as a result of a tax relief measure to 0.4875 per 
cent and 0.975 per cent respectively for 2014, and 0.475 per cent and 0.95 per cent 
respectively for 2015.162 
 
Cost of goods sold includes expenses related to raw materials, production labour, 
depreciation, depletion, and amortisation costs. Intangible drilling and dry hole costs as well 
as geological and geophysical costs incurred to identify and locate property that has the 
potential to produce minerals are also included in cost of goods sold.163 However, cost of 
goods sold does not include distribution costs, outbound transportation costs, contract 
bidding expenses, interest expenses or income taxes. If a taxpayer elects to subtract 
compensation from total revenue, the compensation amount must equal total salaries paid, 
limited to US$300,000 per employee plus certain fringe benefits.164  
 
The resulting margin is then apportioned to Texas, based on the proportion of gross receipts 
in the state vis-à-vis the entire unitary business.165 The unitary business is comprised of 
either separate parts of a single entity, or separate parts of an affiliated group of entities that 
are sufficiently interdependent, integrated and interrelated so as to provide a synergy and 
mutual benefit .166 Relevant factors include vertical integration, ‘such as the steps involved in 
the production of natural resources, including exploration, mining, refining, and marketing’.167 
For each unitary business, a combined report is required.168 The combined group does not 
include taxable entities that conduct business outside of the US if at least 80 per cent of the 
entity’s property and payroll are assigned to locations outside the United States.169  
 
The combined group determines total revenue by combining the individual revenue of each 
member, then adding the total revenue of the members, and, finally, subtracting items of total 
revenue received from a member of the combined group.170 In determining the margin, the 
entire combined group must elect to subtract either cost of goods sold,171 or compensation; 
                                                 
159  Revenue from very low-producing oil (10 barrels per day) and gas (250 Mcf per day) wells may be excluded from total 
revenue. See Tex. TC Sec 171.1011. 
160  Acts of 83rd Legislature, Regular Session, HB 500, Sec. 6 Tex. TC Sec. 171.101(a), (b). Sole proprietorships and 
general partnerships with no limitation of liability are not taxable entities under the Revised Franchise Tax law. Tex. TC 
Sec. 171.0002. Taxpayers with total revenue of less than US$10 million may also elect to be taxed at a rate of 0.575% 
on total in-state revenue from the entire unitary business. Tex. TC Sec. 171.1014. 
161  Tex. TC Sec. 171.002. 
162  These changes are part of a larger package of tax relief enacted in June 2013. Acts of 83rd Legislature, Regular 
Session, HB 500, Sec. 2, Tex. TC Sec. 171.0022-171.0023. 
163  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1012. 
164  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1013.  This includes workers' compensation benefits, health care, employer contributions made to 
employees’ health savings accounts and retirement. The salary cap is also adjusted for inflation. 
165  Tex. TC Sec. 171.106. 
166  ‘Affiliated group’ means a group of one or more entities in which a controlling interest is owned by a common owner or 
owners, either corporate or non-corporate, or by one or more of the member entities, or a corporation, either more than 
50% owned directly or indirectly of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of the corporation, or more 
than 50% owned directly or indirectly of the beneficial ownership interest in the voting stock of the corporation. TC Sec. 
171.0001(1). 
167  Tex. TC Sec. 171.0001(17). 
168  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1014. 
169  If the entity has no property and payroll, the gross receipts factor is used. 
170  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1014(c). 
171  Any payment made by one member of an affiliated group to another member of that affiliated group not included in the 
combined group may be subtracted as a cost of goods sold only if it is a transaction made at arm's length. Tex. TC Sec. 
171.1012(l). 
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and in either case the taxable margin may not exceed 70 per cent of the group’s total 
revenue.172 If the group elects to subtract cost of goods sold, each member first calculates its 
cost of goods sold as if it were an individual taxable entity; these amounts are then 
combined; and, finally, any amounts paid from one member of the combined group to 
another member of the combined group are subtracted, but only to the extent the 
corresponding item of total revenue was subtracted in determining total revenue.173 The 
process is the same for compensation.174 As a result, intra-group transactions are excluded 
in determining the taxable margin of the combined group. As with single taxpayers the 
resulting margin is apportioned to Texas, based on the proportion of gross receipts in the 
state vis-à-vis the entire unitary business.175 
 
The Business Margin Tax represents a middle way between a gross receipts tax and a net 
income tax. It is an attempt to simplify tax administration, especially for small and medium 
enterprises, and at the same time increase revenue by broadening the taxable base through 
elimination of deductions for distribution costs and interest expenses, and aggregating 
income from the unitary group while substantially lowering tax rates.176 A stated purpose of 
the tax was also to align the Franchise Tax with the modern economy better (Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts 2013: 12). Evaluations have indicated that, since its adoption 
in 2008, the tax has been moderately successful in reducing tax planning by avoiding profit 
shifting through corporate restructuring and transfer pricing (Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts 2013:13).177 However, the amount deducted through the cost of goods sold has 
been much higher than expected: taxpayers have deducted 82 per cent or more each year 
through this election. Among other sectors, the mining industry pays less Business Margin 
Tax than its share of the economy ((Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2013: 4), and 
compared to the pre-2008 Franchise Tax (4.5 per cent on earned surplus and 0.25 per cent 
on capital less debt with separate entity reporting), the mining sector Business Margin Tax 
collection share has decreased by 6 per cent (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2013: 
Tables 5, 7). This may be due in large part to the fact that the mining sector has retained 
many of its traditional deductions, such as intangible drilling costs, depletion, and 
geophysical costs through the cost of goods sold election, while subject to a much lower rate 
of 0.5 per cent. 
 
Table 11 illustrates the comparative relationship between mineral revenue in Texas. Oil and 
Gas Property Taxes dominate mineral revenue collection, followed by Oil Production and 
Regulation Taxes. Natural Gas Production and Regulation Taxes follow, with royalties, 
bonuses and Sales Tax next. The Business Margin Tax yields the smallest portion of 
revenue from the industry. Furthermore, the ability of the Business Margin Tax to provide 
information on marketing costs under the Oil Production Tax is limited, because the cost of 
goods sold does not include distribution costs, which include outbound transportation costs. 
 
                                                 
172  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1014(d). 
173  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1014(e). 
174  Tex. TC Sec. 171.1014(f). 
175  Tex. TC Sec. 171.106. 
176  The Business Margin Tax was created as a compromise to replace part of the revenue lost from a one-third reduction in 
school district property taxes . However revenue from the tax has not met expectations, due in large part to the 
economic recession, but also due to high cost of goods sold deductions. In the past three years, however, revenue has 
increased due to the economic recovery, coupled with a rapid increase in production from shale formations in several 
parts of the state. 
177  See also Texas Taxpayers and Research Association (2011). 
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Table 11 Texas mineral revenue 
Revenue source Revenue  
(FY 2011 US$ million) 
Property Tax for oil, gas and other minerals 2,252.12178 
Oil Production and Regulation Taxes 1,472.85 
Natural Gas Production and Regulation Taxes 1,109.72 
Oil and gas bonuses and rentals 763.82 
Oil and gas royalties 638.59 
Oil and Gas Extraction Sales Tax 489.1 
Business Margin Tax 320.26 
 
Source: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2013: Table 1); Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Texas Transparency, 
State Revenue by Category; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Quarterly Sales Tax Historical Data; Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts (2012)  
 
                                                 
178  Assumes average property tax rate of 2.124% (may be slightly overstated as most oil/gas production takes place in rural 
areas where property taxes are lower). 
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